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ABSTRACT 
 
Jill Lauren Kauffman 
 
POETRY “FOUND” IN ILLNESS NARRATIVE: A FEMINIST APPROACH TO 
PATIENTS’ WAYS OF KNOWING AND THE CONCEPT OF  
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
 
 This project contributes to the improvement of the healing encounter between 
physician and patient and broadens the scope of medical ethics via application of a 
methodology that creatively communicates patient experience. Contemporary medical 
training and socialization can create emotional distance between patients and physicians, 
which has both positive and negative effects. A physician’s “detached concern” often 
renders patients’ ways of knowing irrelevant to their care. This has a negative effect on 
patient autonomy, trust, and the healing encounter in general. Herwaldt (2008) developed 
a pedagogical tool of distilling patient interviews in narrative form into “found poems,” 
in which the patient experience is expressed in verse; Herwaldt contends that the 
resulting poems hold the possibility of cultivating empathy in medical practitioners. My 
research extends Herwaldt’s work with a new set of ten patients currently in cancer 
treatment, translating their stories of illness into verse. The resulting poems have the 
potential to empower patients by legitimizing their narrative or experiential ways of 
knowing as complementary to physician perspectives and approaches to treatment. 
Clinical and feminist ethics are similar in their attention to case context, empathy, and 
legitimacy of narrative. However, there are aspects of feminist ethical theory that are not 
thoroughly delineated in clinical ethics—specifically, attention to power imbalances in 
medical structures and variations in ethical perspectives. When the poems are examined 
using a feminist bioethical framework, patients are empowered by expanding both the 
idea of justice and the principlist definition of autonomy to include the feminist 
conception of relational autonomy.     
 
       Peg Brand, PhD, Committee Chair 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Personal stories of illness—which can take the form of texts (poetry, prose) and 
images (visual media)—are more important than ever to doctors and other medical 
professionals in becoming more effective and respectful healers. The fact that these 
narratives exist in many forms likely conveys the human need to share stories in the name 
of healing. Many forces restrict physicians’ abilities to reflect on their clinical 
experiences and relationships. Without ample reflection, medical practice is unable to 
grow and become more humane. Contemporary medical training and socialization can 
create emotional distance between patients and physicians, which has both positive and 
negative effects. Negatively, a physician’s “detached concern” can render patients’ 
narrative or experiential ways of knowing irrelevant to their care. This has a negative 
effect on trust between patient and doctor, and the healing encounter in general. The 
current marketplace of healthcare speeds up the encounter between patient and doctor, 
preventing a deeper connection that would facilitate healing. The pervasive use of 
computers has replaced handwritten notes in patients’ charts, possibly to the detriment of 
physicians’ processing and intellectual and emotional understanding. The innovations of 
medical technology which have been beneficial to a great number of patients further 
remove the doctors from the people’s suffering and remove the human element of the 
illness experience. Paradoxically, the work of physicians is “centered on telling stories 
and on hearing stories, and by choosing one kind of story over another, we can transform 
our practice of medicine” (Charon 1986, 10). The narrative medicine movement seeks to 
bring practitioners back, closer to the stories of illness, to more humanely and effectively 
bring about healing.  
 
Narrative and Ethics 
 Narrative has been variously described as a “fundamental way of organizing 
human experience and as a tool for constructing models of reality” (Pullman et al. 2005, 
280). Narrative medicine, as defined by Charon (2001) is medicine practiced with the 
ability to “recognize, interpret, and be moved to action by the predicaments of others” 
(83). Both sickness and healing can be conceived as narrative acts, and Hunter (1991) has 
pointed out that even medical knowledge itself is narrative-based. Narrative techniques 
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utilized in medical practice can both assist the sufferer in enduring illness, and confer on 
clinicians a new kind of understanding and ability for reflection, as narrative practices 
encourage doctors to reflect on the experiences of their patients (Charon 2001). This 
reflection seems to be the precursor to empathy; if physician socialization leads to 
potentially cold and detached attitudes on the part of new practicing doctors, then 
narrative medicine is presented as a potential repair for this predicament. With 
development of skills in empathy and reflection, could more humanism and 
professionalism follow? Coulehan (2006a) notes that the pervasive belief in medicine—
and traditional ethics—that emotional response weakens us is by no means evidence-
based. Much of ethical theory is just that: theory. It often invokes rules and principles that 
are designed to work from the top down. Using narrative to derive ethical conclusions, or 
narrative ethics, brings a closer lens to the stories behind ethical dilemmas. Rather than 
theory alone, a narrative bioethics is a bioethics that focuses on key moments of the 
medical encounter—instead of overarching theories and rules to be applied to ethical 
decisions, a narrative ethics can closely examine the moment of diagnosis or interaction 
with a physician. It is a bioethics grounded in the grassroots.  
 The institution of medicine, as it stands, promotes a specific kind of truth—
scientific truth that can only be proven with chemical tests or imaging studies, 
decipherable only by those who have been trained to do so. The power is in the hands of 
those with knowledge, and this can lead to decision-making and interventions that 
sometimes override patient autonomy. In the case of medical uncertainty or disagreement 
between practitioners, information can be distorted by the time it reaches the patient. 
Disclosure of medical error is infinitely complicated by the litigious culture of the United 
States. Even if medicine promotes individual patient autonomy and completely informed 
consent, as long as the knowledge is disseminated by one party (the physician) and 
received by another (the patient) in the medical encounter, this autonomy based on 
informed consent is incomplete. As long as the power differential favors the physician 
role, patients are at a disadvantage. “Currently, medical ethics is overwhelmingly 
physician ethics” (Warren 1989, 82-83). Bruner (1985) makes a distinction between 
paradigmatic and narrative ways of knowing. He defines paradigmatic as logico-
scientific, requiring formal verification and empirical proof, and it is this way of knowing 
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which holds authority in medicine. The narrative way of knowing involves stories of 
human interaction, which is the way of knowing reflected in patient experience and 
narratives. Shifting power to the patient calls for more listening. 
 I adopt Bruner’s term narrative, as it is able to get much closer to what I have 
found in my patient narratives and what I seek to legitimize. However, I seek to build 
upon and go beyond Bruner’s definition, as it stands to gain from feminist theory. A 
narrative way of knowing combines aspects of intuition and experience. It is also 
subjective. Belenky et al (1986) define subjective knowledge as what can be gleaned 
from the “inner voice,” or the intuition; they find that subjectivist knowers “distrust logic, 
analysis, abstraction” (71). For subjective knowers, truth is an intuitive reaction, 
experienced and felt. Subjective truth is unique to each individual, an “accident of 
personal history and experience” (69). Beyond subjective knowing is connected knowing, 
which “builds on the subjectivists’ conviction that the most trustworthy knowledge 
comes from personal experience rather than the pronouncements of authorities” (112-
113). Constructed knowledge integrates intuitive knowledge with knowledge learned 
from others through listening. For Belenky et al (1986), listening is a way of knowing. 
There are elements of all of these ways of knowing—intuitive, experiential, subjective, 
connected, constructed, listened and heard—implicit in my use of Bruner’s narrative 
term throughout. 
 
Poetry, Medicine and Patient Listening 
 The concentration of medical education on hard science and technology has 
perpetuated a separation between the life of the individual and his or her own physical 
body. Herwaldt (2008) developed a pedagogical tool of distilling patient interviews in 
narrative form into “found poems,” in which the patient experience is expressed in verse; 
Herwaldt contends that the resulting poems hold the possibility of cultivating empathy in 
medical practitioners. Herwaldt interviewed patients about their illness experiences, 
transcribed the interviews, removed redundant words and added line breaks, forming the 
result into a poem on the page. She interviewed those who had written about their illness 
experiences and published their narratives because she felt that it was these patients who 
had already been able to reflect deeply on their experiences and therefore might have had 
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deeper insights to share. My research extends Herwaldt’s work with a new set of ten 
patients currently in cancer treatment, who have not yet written down or otherwise 
formally shared their experiences, translating their stories of illness into verse. My project 
contributes to the improvement of the healing encounter between physician and patient 
and broadens the scope of medical ethics via application of a methodology that creatively 
communicates patient experience. Poetry and medicine share several relevant parallels, 
and this facilitates the expression of patient experiential data in the form of verse. The 
poems that I have “found” have the potential to empower patients: first, by legitimizing 
their narrative ways of knowing as complementary to physician perspectives and 
approaches to treatment, and second, by refining the dominant bioethical ideal of 
autonomy. 
 Herwaldt finds that her found poetry has the potential for cultivating listening 
skills in physicians and medical students, promoting empathy and more rewarding 
patient-physician relationships. When students, physicians, and laypeople are exposed to 
the poems derived from patient experience, they must pay close attention to perspectives 
that are not often given voice in the medical encounter. The perspectives of patients on 
their own illness experience and their own bodies can be discounted, becoming secondary 
to biomedical truth—test results, for example. Given consideration in a unique way in my 
research results, these patients’ perspectives illuminate feminist bioethical principles in a 
new and creative way. These feminist principles can influence clinical bioethics; a 
feminist-inspired clinical ethics more effectively addresses systemic injustices in the 
medical establishment. It would pay more attention to justice and equality toward women 
and other marginalized identities along the lines of race, class, ethnicity, religion, and 
sexual orientation. The feminist ethical framework offers a constructive critique of 
bioethical principlism and autonomy specifically, along with a revaluing of emotion in 
ethical deliberation that would support the practice of clinical ethics. If applied, feminist 
theories have a great deal to offer medical ethics as far as refining concepts of 
autonomy—toward a relational conception— and justice. 
 Herwaldt’s choice of poetry as a medium is more than an arbitrary or aesthetic 
choice. Poetry requires empathy, and seeing connections, much like medical practice 
itself. Coulehan (2006a) writes that in medical practice, there is a tension between 
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detachment and connection, objectivity and subjectivity, and steadiness and tenderness. 
Likewise, poetry creates great tension in its language and structure. Physicians, in their 
practice of medicine, have “unusually broad and deep access to human suffering” (2006b, 
xii) Both medicine and poetry are a study in contrasts: life and death, light and darkness, 
joy and suffering. Coulehan (2006a) asserts that the tensions in medicine can generate 
creative energy on the part of both physician and caregiver. Indeed, “there is a terrible 
poetry to suffering” (Coles 1989, 100). Coulehan (1998) writes that medicine and poetry 
draw from the same deep well, presumably that of human emotion, relationships, and 
experience. At the center of medicine is the “poetic act of being with, simply standing in 
the presence of suffering,” and like poetry, “medicine cannot be stripped of metaphor, 
image, symbol, meaning, and interpretation” (xvi). There is a great deal of grey area in 
medicine—with medical uncertainty, patients must often reside among absolutes—cure 
and failure, positive and negative, lab values present and absent. It is often uncomfortable 
for both patients and practitioners to exist in the uncertainty of the gray area. If medicine 
is expectation, training, and discipline, then how can one account for uncertainty, 
intuition, and luck? Poetry often seeks to put words to those grays, to the uncertainty and 
the ambiguities encountered as part of the human condition. Poetry allows for finding 
comfort in the gray area of human existence, and order in chaos. Indeed, “the imaginative 
thinking expressed in certain kinds of stories or poems occupies this shadowy area 
between particulars and generalities, rules and exceptions” (Shapiro 1993, 10). Poetry 
also has parallels with ethics. Shapiro (1993) writes that practical ethical reasoning must 
go beyond the “mechanical application of a set of rules; like “’poetic reasoning’ it entails 
attention to particulars, a readiness for the surprising, and some capacity to improvise” 
(9). He offers poetry as a way to mediate our ethical judgment, and recommends that we 
cultivate this ethical imagination using poetry  
 Embedded in my poetic research results, we have narrative and narrative ethics, in 
which ethical principles can be derived from life stories; both medical ethics and feminist 
ethics incorporate narrative to differing degrees in getting to their ethical conclusions. For 
Johnson (1993), “unless we can put ourselves in the place of another, unless we can 
enlarge our own perspective through an imaginative encounter with the experience of 
others, unless we can let our own values and ideals be called into question from various 
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points of view, we cannot be morally sensitive” (199). My project gets to both the 
principlist goal of honoring patient autonomy—albeit a relational, feminist idea of 
autonomy—and to the aim of feminist ethics of identifying and working to end 
“oppression,” wherever it can be perceived. My results contribute to generalizable 
knowledge of the experience of patients who have been previously voiceless. Creating 
and interpreting poetry requires close listening, and close listening works toward 
promoting more empathic caregivers. Spiro (1993) writes that “the ear is as important as 
the eye in medical practice;” if “artists learn to see by drawing, so doctors can learn 
empathy by putting themselves in their patients’ place” (4-5).  
 
Feminist Bioethics 
 Clinical and feminist ethics are similar in their attention to case context, empathy, 
and legitimacy of narrative. However, there are aspects of feminist ethical theory that are 
not thoroughly delineated in clinical ethics—specifically, attention to power imbalances 
in medical structures and variations in ethical perspectives. For feminist ethicists, moral 
theories and principles are deficient insofar as they ignore those cultural values 
traditionally associated with women. Ethics from a feminist perspective attempt to 
reconceptualize and reformulate traditional ethics to the extent it depreciates or devalues 
women's moral experience; such approaches are committed to correcting male biases1 
(Tong 2009). While feminist ethics starts out of female subordination, it need not stop 
there—it holds promise for others, like patients, whose perspectives are often overlooked. 
When my poems are examined using a feminist bioethical framework, my subjects (and 
other patients) are empowered by expanding both the idea of justice and the principlist 
definition of autonomy to include the feminist conception of relational autonomy.  
                                                        1 It is important to note that non-feminist approaches are not necessarily anti-feminist or male biased. 
Likewise, feminist approaches do not necessarily exclude men or include anti-male rhetoric in their 
calculations. In addition, there are male philosophers contributing significant work to feminist ethics 
(Jaggar 2001).  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Relational Autonomy 
 Feminist theorists have suggested a relational model of autonomy, differing from 
the bioethical standard conception of autonomy generally couched in informed consent 
(Meyers 1989, Keller 1997, McKenzie and Stoljar 2000). Principlist autonomy has been 
accused of placing a premium on the potentially masculine ideals of “independence, self-
sufficiency, and separation from others, at the expense of a recognition of the value of 
relations of dependency and interconnection” (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 8). Relational 
autonomy is instead premised on the fundamentally feminist idea that persons are socially 
embedded, and that agents’ identities and behaviors are influenced within the context of 
social relationships and responsibilities (4). In other words, autonomy is simply not 
possible without social relationships with family, friends, and caregivers—autonomy 
cannot exist in a vacuum. This follows from the feminist criticism of the self as 
independent and atomistic, which leads to an overly simplistic (and not too realistic) 
conception of autonomy.  
 Justice as a bioethical ideal also stands to gain with feminist ethical insight. While 
justice according to a principlist framework refers to the just allocation of healthcare 
resources2, feminist theory pays attention to justice on a different scale. At both the 
individual level and the group level, justice for feminists means equality toward 
marginalized people and freedom from oppression. With assistance in navigating 
disparate knowledge and power levels, feminist conceptions of justice are better able to 
address systemic (and oppressive) conflicts within the structure of medicine. It is 
important to define “oppression” in this context; a distinctly feminist ideal is that of 
mitigating oppression. For the purposes of my research, eliminating oppression is 
embodied in the act of giving voice (via poems) to those whose voices had not yet been 
heard (my patient-subjects). In Western biomedicine, scientific and empirical ways of 
knowing—blood chemistry tests, imaging studies—alone hold authority as truth-tellers. 
The delegitimization of narrative patient ways of knowing about their own bodies within 
the dominant culture of medicine is suppression of a form of knowledge. This 
suppression is reductionist—it reduces the patient to a collection of symptoms or                                                         
2 See Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pg. 226. 
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maladies, removing a part of the puzzle, of their story. If a physician is not attuned to the 
context in which symptoms exist, he or she might be missing a key diagnostic tool.  
 Illness itself is oppressive. It prevents patients from expressing their full 
capabilities. Without an understanding of a patient’s story, history, and perception of 
their own condition and body, a physician might be indirectly responsible for continuing 
a patient’s oppression in the form of illness. Without feeling that they are being listened 
to, a patient might not feel valued. If they do not feel valued, trust suffers, and they might 
have a pessimistic attitude toward their own recovery or they might not be compliant with 
treatment. This is harmful to the overall goal of medicine—healing. I do realize that to 
consider the physician-patient encounter legitimately “oppressive” is a bold stance to 
assume; however, hierarchical structures based on differing levels of knowledge in the 
medical encounter are inevitable and feminist ethics is concerned with oppressive 
systems. It calls into question hierarchies not questioned by biomedical ethics, holding 
promise for social change. 
 
Overview 
 Because my claims start with the assumption that medical education and 
socialization can ultimately be harmful to the healing encounter itself, I will begin this 
project with a literature review of the process of becoming a physician and its effects. 
Following my examination of empathy loss during the course of medical socialization, I 
will examine illness narrative and the narrative medicine movement, which suggests that 
patient narrative holds promise for improving the healing encounter by cultivating 
empathy. Poetry and medicine share several interesting parallels—which make it 
compelling as a creative way of expressing study data for both Herwaldt and myself—
and in the subsequent section, I will provide an analysis of poetry and metaphor and its 
parallels with medicine and illness. Poetry also has interesting implications for ethics. 
Herwaldt’s method—and subsequently, mine—deserves a section of its own, with 
specifics on Herwaldt’s claims, and how I was able to derive similar poems from my own 
patient interviews. The poems are presented, followed by philosophical analysis. My 
conclusions with regard to legitimizing both patient ways of knowing and relational 
conceptions of autonomy rely on ideas derived from feminist ethics, and I include a 
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review of the literature of the same. Included in that section is an analysis of 
contemporary principlist bioethical theory and its differences from and similarities with 
feminist bioethical theory, specifically with regard to autonomy and justice. An 
examination and explication of narrative ethics and what it requires follows. I conclude 
with a reassertion of my claims surrounding patient ways of knowing and relational 
autonomy, and some suggested applications of the Patient Listening method. 
 10 
2.0 THE SOCIALIZATION OF PHYSICIANS 
 
 Before I present a review of the literature on medical education and socialization, 
I feel it is important (in the spirit of fairness) to qualify some of the points that I will be 
making. The sources that I cite in evidencing the indoctrination of medical students might 
seem to suggest a monolithic type of doctor being created without much apparent 
qualification of how that training might affect different types of temperaments. These are 
patterns of training and certainly, not all medical students will react to them in the same 
way. There is going to be variation in temperament among medical students, but some 
minimal fortitude of temperament is needed to sustain during long hours and difficult 
situations. I have no doubt that personality plays a role in the result of medical 
socialization—in what kind of doctor one becomes in the end. I am not asserting that 
there is a single ideal temperament that takes to this training and socialization better than 
others, nor do I feel comfortable claiming that some temperaments will ultimately fail in 
becoming a tough or an empathic doctor. Those who successfully become physicians are 
committed unquestionably to caring for people in difficult circumstances. 
 There are certainly benefits that the existing socialization toward distance can 
confer. Difficult circumstances necessitate the development of emotional armor for 
protection. This armor allows physicians to practice medicine without destroying 
themselves, and in that it is positive. Without a caring, but sufficiently detached, affect, 
they would have a difficult time surviving and effectively treating patients under stressful 
circumstances. Development of psychological toughness is encouraged via an embedded 
element of psychological training. It can also, unfortunately, have a negative effect on the 
physicians and the patients for whom they care. 
  
Pre-med and Medical School 
 Examining the education—including the “hidden curriculum,” or the implicit 
messages undergirding the content that is directly taught—and the simultaneous 
socialization of physicians leads to exposure of a few dominant themes. From the 
undergraduate years, competition for grades leads to a singular focus—hard scientific 
facts—and in the race to stay at the top, more humanistic skills fall by the wayside due to 
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sheer lack of time and cultivation. The disembodiment of physicians—or the lack of 
attention to the body of the individual person in favor of the mind alone—begins early, 
and students learn anatomy along with a certain objectification of the human body, a 
“separation of soma from persona” (Conrad 1988, 325). This is billed as a survival 
strategy, and once in medical school, students are not exposed to patients until the third 
year, when clinical rotations begin. It is a coping mechanism: if students are not able to 
separate the person from the body, how else are they to dissect cadavers in the anatomy 
lab, or deal with the instant intimacy that comes with the first patient encounters? It 
becomes necessary early on for students to “transform the person into a set of esoteric 
body parts and change their intimate contact with the body into a mechanical or analytic 
problem” (Smith and Kleinman 1989, 60). This strategy is lasting.  
 Emotional responses are natural and inevitable in these new and awkward 
situations, but students learn early on that they are not to discuss their feelings with 
faculty members or other students, and thus, private feelings remain just that, despite 
their universality (59). Students develop strategies to manage emotions. Not only are 
these coping strategies potentially detrimental to the future doctor-patient encounter, they 
often last long into the physicians’ careers. Students learn to “transform the patient or 
procedure into an analytic event, accentuating comfortable feelings that come from 
learning and practicing ‘real medicine.’” (Conrad 1988, 328). This “real medicine” is 
hard science, technology and procedures. By ignoring the resulting emotions from 
intimate contact with other human beings, the patients, and often their lives, their stories, 
and the circumstances that make them unique as human beings are distanced. Discomfort 
can be managed by irrationally blaming patients, by cruel jokes (“gallows humor”) and 
by the avoidance of sensitive contact or connection. 
 When training to become physicians, medical students undergo “dramatic 
personal transformations, often in a relatively short time, that render them unrecognizable 
to themselves” (Charon 2001, 84). What can make them unrecognizable can be the loss 
of the ability to empathize with others, and particularly with patients. Along with the 
screening of emotion mentioned above, students are ultimately shifting their 
identification from patients to doctors; from objects and from bodies, to professionals and 
minds. Affective neutrality (associated with reason) reinforces professionals’ power. 
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Smith and Kleinman (1989) call development of an appropriately controlled professional 
affect one element of professional socialization. This control precludes emotion, and in 
lacking, it becomes more difficult to relate with those who are still in possession of 
emotive faculties. This is not just implied, it is taught: “students are taught that excessive 
concern for patients can cloud their clinical judgment, but moderate concern allows them 
to manage their own feelings and pay close attention to the patient” (67). This 
“moderate” concern—detached concern— is difficult to achieve and maintain, but 
because there are benefits to learning how to maintain distance, it is advocated implicitly. 
A physician overwhelmed and conflicted by emotion and exhaustion, particularly during 
life-or-death situations when swift action is required, cannot be successful.   
 
Internship and Residency 
 The years following medical school, the internship year and the years of 
residency, are notoriously demanding. Hours and hours are spent at the hospital, as 
inexpensive labor in exchange for learning experience; it is now, when new doctors have 
precious little time and many patients and related responsibilities, that patterns learned 
during medical school are solidified. There is a clear and established hierarchy in medical 
training, and medical students learn from interns, who learn from residents, who learn 
from attending physicians. The sheer number of patients makes it very difficult to spend 
any time in consideration of anything beyond immediate biological threat. New 
physicians are stretched thin. Many learn to cope by taking medical histories and 
presenting cases to superiors that distance themselves from patients, which is the start of 
a loss of empathy. “Just the facts” becomes a normative guideline for patient-doctor 
encounters; “techniques that doctors acquire as interns for managing their caseload 
evolve into a detached and distant orientation to the doctor-patient relationship” (Mizrahi 
1984, 161-164). 
 As can be imagined, much stems from the sheer number of patients with a 
demand on an intern or resident’s time. The new doctors learn, often from more senior 
residents, that it is acceptable to take shortcuts and omit information if it does not seem 
“directly pertinent to the medical diagnosis” (Mizrahi 1984, 160). What bearing does 
social condition or patient narrative have that can be considered “directly pertinent” to 
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biological ailment? In this context, not very much. The role expectations of the medical 
resident have not been breeched if he or she does not choose to sit and talk to a patient, 
and in this framework, no one will be upset or be held accountable. However, if he or she 
fails to obtain, for instance, a hemoglobin level, there will be a problem, both with 
supervisors and the treatment plan. Even if a doctor is particularly humanistic coming in, 
the more time passes, the more social factors are neglected, until it becomes very difficult 
to consider such factors relevant. 
 When these new physicians are responsible for caring for a very large number of 
patients, unsurprisingly, the disease alone, and its potential cure, is the sole focus. It is the 
most immediate concern the patient faces, and often one of the easiest issue to address. 
Not surprisingly, “the actual amount of physical time spent with patients is brief” 
(Mizrahi 1984, 159). When time is scarce, specific tactics are employed: “patient 
avoidance, focused interactions, and objectification allow house staff members to manage 
case-load by restricting range and depth of personal involvement with patients” (162). 
Interactions can be focused on only the most important issue at a given moment, which 
might, for instance, be a blood test; not much time is left to address individual 
psychosocial factors. One must remember that the interns and residents are there to learn, 
particularly procedures. Patients are in danger of becoming simply means to the medical 
staff members’ ends: “the doctors were so intent on doing things to the patients that they 
seemed to have little time or desire to do things for them” (159).  
 In addition to recording standard case histories, which instead of life narratives of 
patients, are simply biomedical specifics, interns and residents are taught the “art” of the 
case presentation. Case presentation is a minimalist craft. The patients’ experiences are 
reduced to subjectively “medically relevant” information in order to be presented to 
instructing attending physicians. “Because it is delivered before superordinates, the case 
presentation serves as an instrument for professional socialization,” and by this point, the 
residents have learned what the attending physicians will find medically relevant, and it is 
most likely not social or familial in nature (Anspach 2005, 362). Compelling beyond the 
content of the case presentations is their language: these exhibitions use language that 
further de-personalizes the patient, making the disease again the sole focus. Passive voice 
is used to mitigate responsibility; the only agents are technology, as in “the CAT scan 
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showed…” or the MRI indicated…” The patients are presented as less-than-trustworthy 
in their own stories; they “state they stopped smoking” or they “claim they have only one 
drink a day”: the language employed indicates a loss of individual agency and the 
patients themselves seem to have little truth to offer (Anspach 2005, 365). 
 
Effects of Socialization 
 The physicians have made strides toward development of a professional 
demeanor; they have cultivated an air of “detached concern.” The subjective narrative 
patient history is not seen as possessing much value, and diagnostic technology has the 
final say. Case presentations have been boiled down to solely “pertinent medical facts.” 
Humor, often inappropriate, is invoked as a coping mechanism against situations of 
extreme stress to relieve the tension, which can lead to delegitimization of patient 
experience and suffering. Patients are discussed in third person, and their objectification 
furthers the idea of disembodiment, and the afflicted body alone is the subject of 
attention. The medical chart itself even becomes a surrogate patient: “the chart seemed to 
be the pivotal point of action around which everything else revolved—ultimately, it was 
the actual embodiment of the patient” (Mizrahi 1984, 158). What is the effect of these 
now-ingrained patterns of behavior and coping strategies? 
 The current system subjects students to long hours of demanding work. The 
attempt to spend as little time as possible with individual patients seems on the surface to 
contradict the very reason why the residents became doctors, but it is a way that is 
developed to lighten the major burden—the patient load. “Distortions of the doctor-
patient relationship and negative reactions to patients develop as subcultural adjustments 
by interns and residents to their work environment,” and as noted, these patterns often 
last a lifetime of medical practice (156). Empathy can be secondary to the task at hand: to 
identify the illness and to treat the biological body.  Consider science itself as an 
emotional management strategy: it is a fundamental separation of feeling from substance 
(Smith and Kleinman 1989, 61). Narrative skills, or the ability to listen to and apply the 
patients’ experiences to the treatment plan, are difficult to maintain. Pullman et al. (2005) 
put it well when they observe that the “stethoscope is a most amazing instrument; it can 
enhance the user’s capacity to hear while decreasing his or her ability to listen” (281). 
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Patients as the “Other:” Us Versus Them 
 Another result of the separation and objectification that can occur between 
doctors and patients is the status of the patient as the “other,” and the “us” (the doctors, 
the minds) versus “them” (the patients, the bodies.) This dualism, a function of the 
socialization process, is fundamentally a coping strategy. Dealing with human tragedy 
and suffering, as physicians often do, requires a sense of being “untouchable.” To be 
vulnerable, like the patient, could be the undoing of the physician, who must remain safe 
and healthy in order to retain the role of healer. “By definition, patients are different; here 
begins their creation as medical objects” (Chambliss 1996, 122). Perhaps unintentionally 
underlying the role of a medical object is delegitimization, which can cause additional 
suffering and undermine the healing process. Surface differences between patients and 
medical staff are often myriad (121). Patients can be very old or very young. Doctors 
possess many years of education and are often highly compensated, while patients’ 
education and wealth vary a great deal. Doctors and patients can differ in religion and 
social class. But above all, patients are sick and doctors are not. As a result, the doctors 
hold the knowledge, and the patients are helpless and dependent. Oliver Sacks, a 
physician who writes of his illness experience, points out that both he and his physician, 
“in a sense, were forced to play roles—he the role of the All-knowing Specialist, I the 
role of the Know-nothing Patient” (Sacks 1984, 105). Much of it is in the name of self-
preservation: 
Staff have good motivations for believing by definition ‘we’ are healthy 
and ‘they’ are sick. They must believe that ‘this cannot happen to me’ 
especially when they spend their lives watching helpless people 
suffer…they may have escaped depression by convincing themselves of 
their immunity to the disease. Some health workers even choose fields 
distant from their own personal concerns: men going into gynecology, 
young people into geriatrics and working with premature infants 
(Chambliss 1996, 123). 
 
Unfortunately, the result can be disempowering to the patient. This results in patients 
who are “institutionally objectified: detached from their own lives and life stories” (120). 
 In the hospital system, other, more obvious barriers separate the ill and the 
healthy. Sacks (1984) notes the  “systematic depersonalization which goes with 
becoming-a-patient”. The ill are dressed in white gowns, and their names are replaced by 
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identification bracelets. They are subject to institutional rules and regulations, and only 
doctors can tell them what is wrong, and what to do about it, and only doctors can 
legitimate them and their illness experiences. In the hospital, “one is no longer a free 
agent, one no longer has rights, one is no longer a player in the world-at-large” (46). This 
definitive separation between doctor and patient, between “us” and “them,” is a 
significant barrier to empathy. 
 
Illness Narrative 
 Illness narratives offer new perspectives outside of the scientific curriculum of 
medical schools, and open the door to personal reflection that the “hidden curriculum” 
discourages. Herwaldt (2008) points out that physicians medicalize everything with 
regard to the patient encounter in order to protect themselves from vulnerability to the 
personal experience; however, the “distinction between physicians and patients is a false 
dichotomy because we are all patients” (19, 15). Echoing the above research regarding 
the process of medical socialization, Herwaldt, a physician herself, also notes the 
“dispassionate distance” and the need to remain objective so as not to affect results or 
become too attached to patients. Indeed, “to become involved with the subject or to be 
subjective is to do bad work” (12). It almost seems intentional to make normative the 
coping strategies you have developed to make survival possible.  
 As I noted above, there are benefits to detachment. A physician caught up in 
emotion or attachment to a particular patient cannot see clearly enough to make 
subjective judgments about courses of medical treatment, especially in emergent 
situations. An overwrought physician is one who is vulnerable to becoming burnt out. 
Again, however, these defense mechanisms can clearly have negative effects for both 
patients and the practice of medicine. In contrast to the prevailing wisdom, “physicians 
are privileged to hear patients’ stories, their secrets, and the most intimate details of their 
lives” (12). Unfortunately, in the minds of many medical trainees, strength and 
connection and emotion are mutually exclusive (Coulehan 2006a). 
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3.0 NARRATIVE MEDICINE, PATHOGRAPHY, POETRY, AND EMPATHY 
 
 Close attention to narratives of illness can refocus the medical encounter from 
biology to the lived experience of a person, and my project falls under the heading of 
narrative medicine. The narrative medicine movement seeks to bring practitioners closer 
to the stories of illness, highlighting the patient and individualizing care. Patients’ 
narratives of illness are offered as a possible balm to the above complications of medical 
socialization. Even medical knowledge itself has a narrative structure, and if a doctor is 
able to see and recognize this, perhaps he or she can validate a patient’s story (Hunter 
1999, xvii). Rather than just concrete empirical science, “medicine is an interpretive 
activity, a learned inquiry that begins with the understanding of the patient and ends in 
therapeutic action on the patient’s behalf” (xx). Every patient’s story, whether just as a 
case report upon admission to a hospital, a medical chart, or an entire life history, is a 
narrative. Illness is not merely pathology; its context is within the narrative of a life. 
Inquiry and legitimization of patient narratives can increase effectiveness of therapeutic 
interventions by promoting communication and satisfaction with the medical encounter. 
 Functional empathy in medical practice takes the form of the clinician figuratively 
entering and inhabiting the perspective of the patient. As described above, this authentic 
experience is often lost in traditional medical training. Academics have suggested the 
reading of literature to develop empathy in medical trainees. The study of literature can 
help doctors understand experience from the perspective of the “other”; as the physician 
pays attention to narrative form, and learns to tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty in these 
stories that have changing and shifting meanings, he or she can apply these same skills 
when listening to a patient. Charon (2000) writes that literature, by fostering 
understanding of the human experience, can both develop empathy and promote self-
reflection in medical trainees. The physician-trainees’ experience of writing and reading 
“sharpens ethical wits: weighing, judging, developing, and refining personal values,” 
which is clearly of interest to those in medical education (Bolton 2005, 173). Illness 
narratives, or pathography, hold promise beyond literature for cultivating empathy. 
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Pathography As Narrative Medicine   
 If recommended methods of teaching, or encouraging, empathy include 
“communication strategies, reading literature, writing reflective narratives,” what role 
does pathography, or illness narrative, play? (DasGupta and Charon 2004, 351).  
“Literature alone cannot create more ethical and sensitive clinicians,” and pathography—
real patient narratives of illness—can fill the void left by this literature (Bolton 2005, 
173). Patients are often a resistant object. They “have their own ideas about what is 
wrong with them, what causes their problems, and how their problems should be treated, 
all of which frequently contradict the medical understandings of disease and treatment,” 
and reading pathography forces the physician to recognize this and take steps toward 
validating differing perspectives (Chambliss 1996, 135). Pathography encourages 
empathy in a more direct way. While literature is limited by themes that might be rather 
abstract, pathography has the power to reach the analytical minds of the physicians, 
minds accustomed to the hard sciences. As pathography is an account of an actual event, 
it has the potential to reach further for this purpose than fiction. Bruner (1985) makes a 
distinction between paradigmatic and narrative ways of knowing; paradigmatic is logico-
scientific, and it requires formal verification and empirical proof. These scientific ways of 
knowing hold authority in medicine. In contrast, Bruner’s narrative way of knowing 
involves stories, drama, human intention, and human action. This is the kind of knowing 
reflected in patient experience and narratives.   
 Hawkins (1999), who has done extensive research in pathography, offers a 
potential use: as an embodiment of the point of view of the patient as part of the healing 
process, which then becomes accessible to others. She suggests that it may “teach the 
effects of physician interaction, and therefore assist in the development of empathy by 
revealing cultural attitudes” (129). Hawkins goes on to point out that pathographies could 
be “invaluable in teaching medical students, less perhaps to understand the experience of 
illness—for no written account can replicate what it is like to be ill—than to grasp the 
importance of the assumptions, attitudes, and myths that patients [and physicians] bring 
to the medical encounter” (xi). If Shapiro (1993) is correct in that “one cannot therefore 
fully understand the course of an illness apart from the course of a life history,” medical 
study and diagnosis without narrative is incomplete (57). 
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Why Poetry? 
 Poetry is a distinct form of literature in which language is used for its aesthetic 
and evocative qualities in addition to, or in place of, its apparent meaning. A poem writ in 
verse is a creative act, using language as the medium, which utilizes form and specific 
conventions to both expand the literal meaning of language and to evoke the emotional 
and sensual. Verse poetry is loaded; it “tends to be so compact, so fully dependent on 
concise expressions of feeling” (Hunter 1999, 3). Words often have double or triple 
meaning; it is as if “poems work out a shareable language for feeling, and one of poetry’s 
most insistent virtues involves its attempt to express the inexpressible” (3). The human 
dimension of medicine often involves profound pain, profound loss, and profound joy, 
and “poetry can be the voice of our feelings when our minds are speechless” as a result of 
these emotions (3). Pathography comes in many forms; in prose, certainly, but also in 
poetry and visual art. Herwaldt presents Patient Listening (2008) as the result of the 
experiment of applying a creative writing exercise to the patient interview transcripts. 
There are established (and interesting) parallels between poetry and medicine, introduced 
above and elaborated below, that made Herwaldt’s method a reasonable choice to frame 
and guide my application of Herwaldt’s method. 
 
Form and Structure 
 The nonlinear form and structure of poetry lends itself better to the representation 
of chaotic life narrative than linear prose narrative. Time does not often pass in a linear 
way in poetry; time seems circular in that it is hard to define when action or images begin 
and end. There is value to the circular versus linear passage of time for talking about the 
illness experience. Linear time is finite and has a definite ending; this can be frightening 
for one who might be closer to the end. There is a certain comfort in the conception of 
time as a circle; returning to the beginning means again becoming the person one was 
before an illness changed everything. This circular sort of narrative resists closure, 
especially important when closure could mean death. Such narrative commits the ill 
person as well as the “poet to neither closure nor openness, but to some always-changing 
relation between the two” (Shapiro 1993, 41). In other words, the “feeling-oriented, 
nonlinear logic of poetry allows for paradox, and even celebrates it” (Fox 1997, 12). 
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Language 
 The abstract and figurative language present in poetry is closer to the abstract and 
metaphoric illness experience than is prose, and likewise, could possibly capture the 
illness experience for the purpose of illness narrative more authentically. Such language 
might be able to better explore suppressed feeling, which does not always come in full 
sentences. There are limits to medical models for representing the illness experience. In 
fact, poetry is one way to locate language for obscure experience. In any case, any strong 
feelings or sensations can be overwhelming and difficult to articulate, let al.one during 
illness. Perhaps such feelings and sensations could be more poignantly conveyed in 
poetry; “poetic language expresses what plain language cannot” (9). Poetry can be used 
to explore the ambiguity and uncertainty present and often not addressed in medicine, the 
constructed nature of medical boundaries, and the experience of social marginalization 
that can occur with illness. Poetry can help to find words for exhaustion, pain, and cold 
so profound that words escape. Poets “try to sharpen the sight, to nurture language 
carefully in the hope of calling upon it for an understanding of what is happening” (Coles 
1989, 101). 
 
Fragmented Narrative 
 In the words of one patient-subject I interviewed: “Pieces and parts together, 
that’s poetry, isn’t it? Pieces and parts”? Kirmeyer (2000), Montello (2002), and Frank 
(1995) compare the experience of illness to having a ruptured life narrative—the life as it 
is known has ended, and it is the job of the physician to put the pieces of the life narrative 
back together into a cohesive whole. The above patient’s conception of poetry is just like 
the life narrative of the ill person, in pieces. Fox (1997) asserts that poetry can assist 
people in reuniting the fragmented parts of their lives. Likewise, Kirmeyer (2000) also 
points out that “in acute illness, narratives are often fragmentary or undeveloped; where 
narratives are most coherent, they also may be “formulaic and distant from sufferers’ 
experience” (153). It would make sense that those coherent, formulaic, and distant 
narratives would be in prose, which sometimes seems tidier than poetry. Indeed, 
just as fragments of poetry can be written with no overarching narrative, 
or only the briefest strand hinted at, so can we articulate without appeal to 
elaborate stories of origins, motives, obstacles, and change. Instead, we 
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may create metaphors that lack the larger temporal structure of narrative 
but are no less persistent or powerful. Such fragments of poetic thought 
may be the building blocks of narrative (Kirmayer 2000, 155). 
 
Repetition 
 Repetition is a familiar convention in verse poetry; when space is at a premium, a 
single word can carry much weight and hammer concepts home. However, it might serve 
an important function in the context of personal stories of illness. Those who are ill are 
dealing in the unfamiliar landscape of medicine and mortality, and repetition of words 
and images can serve as a psychic touchstone to keep them grounded and centered when 
the rest of their lives are spinning around them. There are certain unavoidable themes in 
the arena of illness, as are evidenced above, and latching on to that certainty might be 
better than having no certainty at all. Here, too, another parallel: “like patients, poets are 
probably holding on for dear life to some words” (Coles 1989, 100). 
 
Illness, Metaphor, and Poetry 
 The central argument in Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor (1977) is that “illness is not 
a metaphor, and the most truthful way of regarding illness—and the healthiest way of 
being ill—is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking” (3). As 
Hawkins (1999) has noted, “pathography can be seen as a re-formulation of the 
experience of illness” (24). Both Broyard (1992) and Schultz (2007) through their writing 
“try to bring illness under control by turning it into a narrative” (Broyard 1992, xiii). In 
fact, Schultz (2007) writes explicitly that she has “been making sense of illness through 
narrative, and narratives may be therapeutic in the sense that they impose order and 
coherence on a chaotic sequence of events” (11). Key for these authors of pathography is 
that they are both rather anti-Sontag in their poetic promotion of metaphors of illness, 
both explicitly and through rhetorical devices. Broyard outwardly rejects Sontag’s goal, 
which is the “elucidation of those metaphors, and a liberation from them” (Sontag 1977, 
4). Sontag might not intend to dismiss metaphor of illness altogether; she claims that 
metaphors, like those of war and battle that have been utilized to talk about illnesses like 
cancer have done a disservice to the practice of medicine. For Sontag, certain (usually 
aggressive) metaphors have become so culturally entrenched that they institute practices 
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that actually deter healing. When something within the body is the enemy, it becomes 
difficult to separate it from the self. When a therapeutic goal is not achieved, it is hard not 
to blame the ill person for not fighting hard enough, and this can be destructive.  
 In spite of this interpretation, Broyard accuses Sontag of being “too hard on 
metaphor,” and it could indeed be argued that Sontag chooses to address herself more to 
the “conceptualization of illness than to the daily experience of it”; humans do think in 
metaphor, and on a smaller scale, metaphor could be a “comforting relief to medical 
terminology,” a kind of “literary aspirin” (Broyard 1992, 18). Broyard appeals again and 
again to the “metaphoric and poetic powers of illness,” writing that “we need to make 
illness metaphorical,” and how “people, if they become ill, must become storytellers, 
must make a story, metaphors, of their illness” (xii, xiii). Schultz writes of her illness 
experience, “whose protean metaphors helped to confront and embrace an alien identity” 
(1). Protean: versatile, mutable, capable of possessing many forms; a “protean metaphor” 
is one whose significance undergoes a series of transformations that inform the reader in 
different ways, not unlike the transformation of the author herself. For Broyard (1992), 
“the sick man sees everything as metaphor,” and he calls metaphor itself a “symptom” of 
his illness (7, 21). He dismisses Sontag, writing, “technical explanations flatten the story 
of illness” (66). 
 Metaphor is an explicit comparison between things not literally similar. When 
Schultz finds a website advocating for her condition, she “devoured this website; it was 
the first satisfying meal I had had in nearly four months,” though the website itself is not 
literally eaten (8). Likewise, Broyard speaks of “eating [a] book for lunch and it making 
[him] hungry” (12). That book was the “prescription [he] needed that no doctor could 
give,” as physicians, alas, write prescriptions for pharmaceuticals and not literature (12). 
Anger and anxiety both are catheters, “inserted in your soul, draining your spirit,” though 
catheters are more likely to literally drain urine (Broyard 1992, 29, 62). While also not 
literal, “stories are antibodies against illness and pain” for Broyard, and “every patient 
needs mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, for talk is the kiss of life” (20, 53). In a particularly 
poignant example, a patient “died not of cancer exactly, but of pneumonia, as if his lungs 
had filled with trapped speech and he had drowned in it” (20). There is some specific 
word play here, and much of it is double entendre—it is difficult to pin down one specific 
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meaning. How similar to illness, in that there is rarely one certain outcome and 
interpretation, and conditions and prognoses can change by the hour. As noted above, 
Broyard, and to a somewhat lesser extent Schultz, employ a great number of rhetorical 
devices, linguistic flourishes, figures of speech, and wordplay, including and beyond 
straight metaphor. Schultz offers a compelling reason for such linguistic acrobatics: there 
is “an essential dishonesty in representing through narrative events that so fundamentally 
defy order” (11). If pain, nausea, and physical discomfort are so difficult to represent 
narratively, what other choice exists but to be creative, or poetic? 
 
The Ethical Imagination and Poetry 
 There is an aesthetic dimension inherent in all ethical decision making; poetry can 
play a role in clarifying, controlling, and communicating this aspect of medical ethics, 
and Shapiro (1993) argues that poetry can in fact cultivate the ethical imagination. He 
defines the ethical imagination as “something within us ‘that doesn’t love a wall,’ that 
seeks to violate boundaries, transgress borders, challenge our customary ways of thinking 
and feeling so as to make our rules, systems, habitual perceptions more responsive to a 
wider range of life,” and he argues that poetry, in whatever form, along with other forms 
of literature, help to cultivate this ethical imagination (4). The celebration of that which 
fails to follow a linear or otherwise predictable narrative, the anomalous and the 
iconoclastic, is crucial. By expanding customary ways of thinking, it becomes more 
possible to appreciate the perspectives of others. This is crucial to ethics, which are not 
always normative and often benefit in this way from a narrative approach. Ethical 
decision-making is a complicated and imperfectly understood process; both poets and 
physicians have common interest in constructing and clarifying the linguistic expression 
of social values that impact healthcare; expressions of emotions attached to these 
experiences help to create value systems that affect medical decision-making (Shapiro 
1993). 
 Poetry is a formal way of seeing, and so is medicine. While suffering from grave 
illness, there is a “breaking through into consciousness of non-narrativized, inchoate 
experience that resists narrative smoothing and containment” (Kirmayer 2000, 169). 
Poetry can get us closer to that experience. Kirmayer (2000) also warns that “talk of 
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poetics risks aestheticizing illness experience. Yet the use of figurative language to evoke 
images and feelings and to persuade others of the seriousness of one’s suffering is central 
to the play of meanings in the clinical encounter” (175-176). Likewise, “it appears that 
the chief imaginative dimension of moral understanding is metaphor” (Johnson 1993, 
193). Metaphor is a definitive convention in poetry. It is also found in pathography, as it 
is difficult to express the extraordinary experience of illness in conventional language. 
My patient-subjects use metaphor to express their experiences, and it is reflected in their 
poetry: chemotherapy is described as a “roller-coaster ride” (4.1) and a patient is a little 
bug, stepped on by “some big thing” (7.7). 
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4.0 HERWALDT’S PATIENT LISTENING 
 
 Herwaldt (2008) introduced a pedagogical tool by which patient interviews are 
transcribed in narrative format, and the transcriptions are then worked into poems by 
removing extraneous words, and by listening closely to the patients’ stories—the rhythm 
and the emphasis—line breaks are added; the remaining words look like poems on the 
page, and each word remaining in the poem maintains a concentrated power. She found 
that the resulting “poems had a concentrated emotional power that the unedited stories 
did not,” and called the result “’found’ poems because they are created from other 
peoples’ words” (5). As noted above, the genre of poetry offers a unique opportunity for 
the capture of the abstract and chaotic experience of being ill, as well as reaching 
audiences in a new way, which is different from straight narrative that might be tuned out 
by students or physicians after so many exposures. 
 Herwaldt notes that she first designed the project to “hear patients’ stories and 
voices and experience their perspectives,” knowing that “patients tell doctors and nurses 
very personal stories, but healthcare providers often respond with technical answers,” 
which can lead patients to feel unheard and dehumanized. She hoped that her research 
could affect communication between patients and healthcare providers in a positive way, 
and both parties would be more satisfied with their interactions (5). When sitting down to 
do a qualitative analysis of the transcriptions, she recalled and experimented with a 
“creative writing exercise in which one writes a paragraph, then deletes words from it, 
and finally arranges the remaining words on the page like a poem” (4). She found that the 
poems were able to find the “gist of the patients’ meaning,” while distilling the “most 
powerful words from their prose” by “keeping the most salient or provocative words and 
heightening their effect with line breaks usually reserved for poetry” (4). 
 Herwaldt chose to interview patients who had already written and published their 
own narrative accounts of their illnesses. She hoped that they—already able to reflect on 
their experiences— “might be able to articulate feelings that for most of us remain 
buried, inchoate, or inexpressible,” and that healthcare workers who listened to the 
narratives would be able to identify such feelings in their own patients (3). While an 
interesting observation and hypothesis led to compelling poetic results, there is a missing 
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demographic here—an entire population of patients who are either unwilling or unable to 
write, publish, or otherwise create an account of their illness experience, and it is they 
who I interviewed for my project. My subjects might have been unwilling to produce 
illness narratives: it might not have occurred to them, or they might feel well enough to 
do so. These same subjects might have been unable to produce illness narratives: they 
might lack adequate access to education and have poor literacy skills, or they might not 
have the time or energy or inspiration to write.  
 Like Herwaldt, I interviewed, transcribed, and “found” poetry by “simply 
listen[ing] to the cadence of the story and plac[ing] line breaks where they felt right” 
(11). Close listening is required, required in the same way it might be when a practitioner 
is listening to a patient narrative in order to determine the origin or process of a disease.  
 
The Politics of Patient Listening 
 Nothing short of the patients writing the poems themselves can more authentically 
capture a voice because the poem is solely in the patient’s own words, and because 
creating the poems requires a close listening of the patients’ narratives (often in a way 
never experienced before by the patients). The transcribed narrative process remains a 
close second to the patients’ own work in maintaining power, control, and voice. That 
said, these narratives (again, in the patients’ own words) are filtered through me, a third 
party. It might be easier, then, to co-opt the narrative of the subject and make 
unauthorized changes, knowingly or not. I, as researcher, had “privileged access to and 
implicit power over the former” (Couser 2004, 17). Indeed, narrative medicine research, 
and this project in particular, has the potential to “drown out, even as it amplifies” the 
previously unheard voice of the subject (39). In addition, cultural differences can impact 
the ability to obtain truly informed consent, on which biomedical autonomy is based. In 
an ideal medical encounter, patients actively challenge medical narratives about their 
condition. However, for some vulnerable subjects, such as those who have never before 
written about their condition, this challenge is difficult if not impossible (32). Without it, 
the ownership of the life narrative is in jeopardy of being co-opted or altered. To answer 
this concern, “the more vulnerable the subjects (the less capable of protecting  
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themselves), the more scrupulous life writers must be about avoiding gratuitously 
harmful representations of them” (30). 
 Ironically, there is danger too when we seek to over-protect potentially vulnerable 
subjects: to say that “subjects are necessarily passive and vulnerable in their 
representation would be patronizing” (202). It is a tenuous balance. In the end, “any 
inquiry into life writing ethics has to acknowledge that life writing can do good for its 
subjects, whether they seek it or not” (20). Indeed, “if we were to adopt a notion of harm 
so broad that any life writing that caused ‘discomfort, humiliation, offense, and 
annoyance’ was considered unethical, we would be adopting an inappropriately 
restrictive standard” (29). As work in narrative medicine often has the goal of 
documenting and witnessing the patient experience, it is difficult to say that such action is 
always beneficent. The act of documentation might be quite neutral; that is to say, not 
necessarily for the benefit of the patient. For example, consider documentary filmmaking. 
The goal of many filmmakers is to simply document an event or a culture, and not to 
disturb, interfere, or affect—positively or negatively—its subjects.  
 
Cancer Stories 
 The subjects of my project are all cancer patients. Cancer patients currently in 
treatment offered me a unique opportunity as a researcher, as they were often receiving 
chemotherapy for long periods of time, offering time for reflection and interviews. In 
addition, a cancer diagnosis demands long relationships with oncologists, which both 
makes the physician-patient relationship that much more significant, as well as offers the 
opportunity to witness the development of that relationship over time.  
 My patient-subjects have not written about their experiences. Choosing not to 
write about one’s experience, or not being able or inclined to do so, shuts out an entire 
population of subjects.  In the end, it might have to be enough to say that for patients who 
might not be able or inclined to express themselves in writing, but have still elected to 
participate and have me interview them, having their story come through me—a close 
and interested listener—might offer some measure of control over their life narratives.  
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 Like Herwaldt’s Patient Listening, I hope that sharing the results of my research 
will illuminate patient and caregiver experiences and perpetuate communication and 
mutual understanding, as well as promote patient control, empowerment, and voice. 
Patients often lose their voices during illness and resulting medical encounters in the 
context of the current culture of medicine. Not all patients are able to process and/or write 
about their experiences like Herwaldt’s patients, and it might seem fruitless or even 
pointless to elicit their experiences again. Giving the patient’s voice a forum in a novel 
way has the potential to not only improve the therapeutic relationship and satisfaction of 
patient and physician, but also offer unique insights that could inform treatment 
decisions. Because my research results share the same traits as Herwaldt’s in displaying 
commonness and uniqueness, conversation, and contradictions within the same patient, 
the call for close listening to patients’ stories of illness likewise apply to my subject 
group. 
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5.0 “FOUND” POETRY 
 
 Herwaldt (2008) chose to interview people who had already written and published 
accounts of their illnesses because she “felt authors who had reflected on these 
experiences might be able to articulate feelings that for most of us remain buried, 
inchoate, or inexpressible” (3). Upon initial examination of my “found” poetry, it seems 
that there is not much of a difference. Just like Herwaldt’s subjects, the participants in my 
project reflected on the importance of communication and honesty with and from 
physicians as well as the initial life-shattering shock of diagnosis. My participants 
express regret over facing mortality. Their lives are changing dramatically, along with 
their own identities; they discuss losing hair to chemotherapy and role reversal in their 
relationships. My patients too spoke about their own faith in God, their doubt, hope, and 
fear. They express frustration and awe at their own overwhelming fatigue and pain and 
emotion, and at painful and frightening procedures. They worry about possible treatment 
failure and their own loss of control. They struggle to remain positive in the face of poor 
prognoses and intimidating odds, and advise others, suggesting remaining positive and 
trying to digest experiences in small chunks. It seems reasonable to conclude that my 
subjects investigate these topics to the same depth as Herwaldt’s subjects. 
 I would like to offer some insight on my creative process in finding the poems 
within the interview transcripts. There was a certain amount of intuition involved in my 
creation of the poems, certainly; I have a background in English literature, and in reading 
poetry comes a certain comfort with listening for poetry in the cadence of patients’ 
stories. Because I was aware of my intention to find poetry from the beginning, as I 
interviewed patients, I listened to where they themselves paused while telling their own 
stories. Their pauses and emphasis is often where they felt they were coming to a key 
point or a climax, and I tried to reflect those pauses and emphasis when I placed line 
breaks in the poems. I was able to listen to the cadence of their speech over and over 
again while transcribing by rewinding and playing again the digital recordings. By the 
time I sat down with the written transcriptions to find the poems, I had listened to their 
voices so many times that I heard them in my head as I read their words. I simply placed 
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line breaks where they did in their speech—the patients knew where they wanted 
emphasis and I was faithful to that wherever I was able to do so in the remembering.  
 This is key to my argument of why I am emphasizing my own (and Herwaldt’s) 
method to flesh out the content of the patients’ narratives over simply using straight 
transcriptions of the patients’ speech: the listening. I had to listen closely to their stories 
each time I heard them: in person, in audio recordings, and in print. I had to listen to their 
stories beyond their content; I listened to their cadence and to their natural line breaks 
and emphasis. I heard them, and I placed them in the poetry, mirroring and emphasizing 
their own stories in a way faithful to them. I specifically listened for repetition in my 
patients’ narratives, of both words and themes, and I used the repetition for emphasis, as 
both a creative strategy and because I trusted that their repetition was intentional. If they 
wished to stress a word, a point, or a theme, I did so as well in the poetry with the goal of 
remaining as true to them and their stories as possible. I had to selectively delete some of 
what the patients said in order to create a more cohesive aesthetic structure, and to 
convey their stories the most effectively. Again, I trusted my ear. If something was said 
only once in an off-handed way, or if it was not stressed or emphasized as an important 
part of a story, I left it out. While others have stressed how important listening is to the 
medical encounter (Charon and Brody, among others) I am promoting an interpretive 
method that takes close listening further in a creative way.   
 My strategy for putting poems into numbered sections was similar to my strategy 
for determining line breaks. I likewise listened to where stories ended, and where the 
patients’ changed topics, and started new poems where their narrative shifted. I 
deliberately numbered the poems, and that is where Herwaldt and I diverged. Herwaldt 
titled her own poems. I felt that titling them would put too much focus on myself and my 
own creative process and interpretation, and I did not feel comfortable imposing myself 
on the poems any more than necessary.  
 
 31 
Patient  1 (27-year old white male, Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia) 
 
1.1 
 
Try to get back to some 
normalcy. Don’t play 
tough guy. Let them know 
what I need to help me 
feel better. If you’re nauseated,  
let’s get it fixed. Don’t fight it.  
Full communication. That is 
the key. If I can’t communicate 
with them and they can’t communicate  
with me, 
 
it’s not going to work out very well. 
 
Just try to live everyday again, but 
knowing that this is something 
that will change me 
forever.  
 
1.2 
 
You are the provider.  
For a man that is a very big thing,  
for most men, because of the sense 
of pride. You want to take care of 
your family and  
your wife.  
Men want to know that they are helping 
their family, so,  
when that gets taken away  
it’s different. Now 
     the roles are reversed.  
 
I haven’t had time 
     to be emotional about it. 
 
1.3 
 
My doctor is very good about 
not necessarily telling you what 
you want to hear. He broke it down 
to what all the possibilities were 
plus risks and 
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that’s okay, that’s his job.  
think you need to know that  
there’s not always an upside,  
     but at least you’re in the know. 
 
It’s better to know 
if something’s not right. Okay, 
why isn’t it right? What are we going to do 
to fix it? That’s better, 
I guess. You have no surprises. 
 
Yeah, I would rather have honesty. 
 
He is a physician 
     in his case, a specialist. 
It’s hard because you can’t get real close.  
If he can keep it on a professional level, but 
     be compassionate 
 by telling you up front,  
 
I think that’s all that people want. 
 
1.4 
 
It’s not something 
you’d want to wish on anybody, 
including yourself. 
 
You got to get better. You have to be  
really positive. Stay as positive 
as you can.  
 
What do you have to do today 
to make it through 
today?  
 
You can break it down 
into days or segments that 
you can digest.  
 
It’s easier that way. With anything 
that you do in life, but 
even more so 
for this.  
 
Faith has something to do with it, too. 
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Patient 2 (63-year old white male, Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia) 
 
2.1 
 
they drew blood 
at four o’clock in the morning and then  
they were back at six and they drew more blood and  
they drew more blood and 
they drew more blood and 
they kept drawing blood 
they just kept the nurses and the people drawing the blood,  
the doctors kept saying they need more blood 
 
2.2 
 
I pretty much 
knew. I didn’t know 
it was leukemia. I’m not a doctor,  
but I knew something was 
wrong.  
 
He said 
how do you feel? I says 
You know, I just feel sort of crappy. I don’t 
feel punky. I don’t 
have the zip I used to have. So he poked 
and prodded and he said why don’t 
we run some blood tests 
to see what may be going on. 
 
He said 
I got some not so good 
news for you kid, he said 
your tests come back abnormal. He said  
we think you have leukemia. Boy,  
they tell you and 
 
it hits you like a ton of bricks. 
 
Sort of first I was in shock. I was 
madder than hell. My emotions 
were just all over the place, they really were, 
they were all over the place.  
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All of a sudden 
you get slapped upside the head with 
something like this, my emotions 
are just 
     all over the place.  
 
People tell me I’m very, 
very sick. 
I really feel good.  
I’m not sick,  
     that’s what I kept telling them.  
 
How could I feel so good and be so damn sick?  
 
2.3 
 
You tell him 
what’s wrong, and he says 
okay, we’ll fix it.  
That’s what I appreciate about him.  
Bad news, good news, I don’t really 
give a damn, just tell me the truth.  
Lie to me and I’m a wild man. Just tell me.  
I will deal with it. So,  
it’s just the way I feel.  
 
It’s nothing new, and this disease 
don’t have nothing to do with it. It’s the way 
I am, it’s just my personality. Don’t  
mess with me, I don’t take that 
well at all,  
never have taken it well,  
never will take it well. I can handle 
bad news though. I can handle that. I can deal  
 
with just about anything. I’ll deal with that. 
I’ll deal with it.  
 
2.4 
 
I just never got comfortable 
with the doctor. I couldn’t get myself comfortable 
with him. I always felt 
that there was something 
that he wasn’t telling me. 
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I didn’t know what it was. I just 
     did not know what it was. 
 
I was one angry  
son of a bitch. I was mad. I mean,  
when I think I am being screwed with 
and people aren’t telling me the truth  
I don’t take that well.  
 
I am losing confidence 
in this guy, I just don’t feel comfortable 
all that’s going on. I was losing confidence 
     at a record pace. 
 
I’ll tell you that the communication 
     between that doctor and myself  
was just not there.  
 
It was zero.  
 
2.5 
 
Honesty honesty honesty 
honesty. Just be honest, just be honest 
with the patient, my God,  
don’t hide anything 
from them. We’re in here scared 
you know, we don’t know what’s going on 
you know, if you don’t feel  
they are being honest with you, 
then your mind gets crazy 
your mind gets crazy like oh my God, 
you get scared, you don’t know 
what’s going on. You know, if the patient asks the nurse 
something or asks the doctor 
something (my God get the answer for them) 
if you know the answer, tell them.  
Tell them.  
 
I don’t know about everybody else,  
but I’ll tell you this patient, 
I want to know. 
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2.6 
 
First it took me a little bit 
to figure out the pecking order  
around here, you know, my Lord, good God!  
A lot of people involved.  
And I finally figured out the pecking order 
and how things work  
around here, and we started to ask  
a lot of questions.  
 
I was sort of inundated 
with people, more people come to see me 
and I am poked and prodded, but 
I didn’t think they were flying 
by the seat of their pants here. 
 
My doctor sat down 
for a good hour, hour and a half 
and took me right through 
the whole thing you know, and  
why they were having the blood drawn, and  
what they were doing. Drew diagrams 
for me, tried to break it down 
that I could understand. 
 
He says 
do you know what they 
are going to do for sure? And  
I said no, not for sure, but 
I have confidence that they 
will know what to do. 
 
I said  
I know they take tests and stuff and 
whatever my tests say,  
that will guide them.  
 
I got a lot of faith 
in God, I got a lot of faith, 
my faith’s strong.  
 
I don’t know why 
I am going through this, I don’t know why,  
but I keep telling myself that there’s a reason 
why I’m going through this, I’m not sure what it is, 
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but there’s a reason, 
I don’t know what my reason 
     is. 
 
2.7 
 
I had some  
fantastic nurses, I can’t speak enough 
good things about the nurses. 
I really can’t. They were just 
great. I was afraid if it wasn’t for the nurses 
I would have been gone 
long before that. 
 
Look, I can’t be laying in this hospital room 
worrying about my wife, worrying 
about my dogs, worried about this, worrying 
about that, all I can handle is worrying 
about myself right now. 
 
Did I want to come back down here 
today? No, I would have rather stayed at home 
with my dogs. But 
 
I knew I had to be here.  
 
2.8 
 
He said,  
what they done, it wasn’t 
all lost. Actually what he said 
was a lot of the chemo worked, and 
it did what it was supposed to 
be doing.  
 
You know how doctors are, they 
won’t cut each other up, but basically, 
I read between the lines.  
 
The guy didn’t know jack shit.  
 
2.9 
 
It’s okay 
that I have emotions 
I guess. For twenty years 
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I was on the fire service.  
For twenty years I suppressed every emotion 
I had in my body to do my job. I couldn’t, 
     I didn’t,  
I couldn’t feel for anybody, 
I really couldn’t. You talk about 
a bunch of hard ass guys. Firemen are pretty 
     tough, pretty tough guys. 
 
To see what we had to see and 
do what we had to do, you 
     couldn’t have any emotions because 
if you did you couldn’t do your job. I mean,  
I seen guys who, I seen people decapitated, I seen 
     some of the nastiest stuff of my lifetime. And  
for twenty years I went through that. It took me years 
 
after that to even really cry. 
 
I was a firefighter for twenty years. 
Fought a lot of fire. Was fire chief 
for a hundred and some guys. Retired and went 
into business, and was CEO of companies 
and plant managers, had a lot guys work for me. Had a lot 
of families depend on what I did, to make sure 
I made the right decisions, and always  
was in control. And now  
 
I’m not in control. I’m not in control.  
And I know it. 
 
2.10 
 
I had the heart attack. It was 
the worst experience  
I ever lived in my life. It hurt like 
     the devil, 
 
but once he fixed me 
he fixed me, it was like  
it never happened. The only thing 
was I was in denial, to be very honest about it.  
     I was so slick  
that I was in denial. When I went back to see him 
a couple weeks later, he said,  
You’re in denial! That’s what he said,  
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You’re in denial! He ripped me 
     from one end to the other.  
 
He didn’t pull no punches 
with me whatsoever, and now I come 
to appreciate what he did, because he knew 
     how to handle me. 
 
Guess they thought the old man was gonna die 
     but I’m too damn mean for that. 
 
2.11 
 
I started getting pains 
in my chest. I thought, ah man, and 
I moved the chair and laid on the couch and  
tried to find a way to get comfortable. Just 
got more pain and more pain and 
I didn’t want to call anybody. I didn’t want 
to bother anybody and finally 
it just reached a point when I had 
     to do something. 
 
As I become more comfortable 
     with the doctors and nurses, it’s easier 
for me to tell them what’s wrong or 
where I hurt. 
 
2.12 
 
I had my hips replaced but 
that was sort of a little wear and tear 
on the old body. I got that straightened out. 
     I lived in a lot of pain for a lot of years and 
I finally broke down and 
got them fixed, and gosh I felt so dang great 
after that. My Lord, it was like a miracle 
to me to feel that good. 
 
Patient 3 (70-year old white female, Acute Myelogenous Leukemia) 
 
3.1 
 
I was just getting really tired 
and it seemed like each day 
I was more tired, and it just seemed like 
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I didn’t have the energy. 
It got to the point where 
when I would even try to make my bed  
in the morning, I would be out of breath. 
 
I just feel so tired 
all of the time 
 
3.2 
 
My daddy died when I was eight years old 
and my mother raised us and 
done a wonderful job, and she had her hands full 
with me. 
 
Didn’t realize at the time 
how strong-willed you can be 
sometimes, but then whenever I got married 
and started having some children,  
we went to church and 
got saved and 
gave my heart to the Lord, and 
then I realized what an awful time 
I had given my mother. But my mother, she doesn’t say too much— 
     you weren’t too bad.  
 
But I was. 
 
3.3 
 
She had come in 
the morning and 
asked me how I was doing. I said  
okay, and everything, and I could see 
she was kind of hesitant. She said  
is your husband coming? And I went yes 
he should be here anytime. She said,  
okay, I’ll come back. 
 
He said you’ve got leukemia. So 
I felt like I run up against a brick wall. 
I wasn’t expecting anything 
like that.  
 
I do depend upon 
the Lord. I thought, oh God, 
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I gotta depend upon you,  you 
are going to help me 
through. I just 
 
took a deep breath. 
 
3.4 
 
I said 
six months! 
That was hard. I thought, 
six months? That is here 
     and gone. But 
whatever happens, 
I am in good hands. I am 
in the hands of the Lord. If  
something happens to me, 
I know where I will be going. I 
will be going to heaven. I 
don’t want to leave my family 
down here, but if you have to,  
that’s the best place to go. I 
 
sure don’t want to go to the other place.  
 
3.5 
 
I have a wonderful church and 
I have a wonderful church 
family and  
they were praying for me.  
 
You know that helped. 
 
I had enough prayer, a lot 
of prayer. I mean 
churches all around, even as far as Ohio, 
     Oklahoma. 
 
Our God is a wonderful 
God and that’s the way our 
God is. And when he knows you 
have to be lifted up, he knows 
how to do it. That really 
 
boosts you up, you know. 
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3.6 
 
He said 
I would like for you to go home and 
enjoy the holidays and 
come up after the first of the year 
to see me. 
 
I had gotten to the point 
where I had no energy and 
really didn’t feel good at all. I did 
mash the potatoes and I did 
fix the turkey and the dressing but 
I think that is about all I did 
that day. I fixed cranberries and 
a couple of squash pies and 
I did make sweet potatoes. 
 
I had no appetite. I lost 
forty-three pounds. And I said 
I never did want to lose pounds. 
 
I have always been the kind of  
hefty-type person, and 
I have always thought I need to lose weight 
but I don’t guess I ever got really sincere 
about it. If I could just lose so much 
weight, this much of weight, you know 
I’d be happy. But 
 
believe me I’m not gonna worry about 
my weight anymore. I’m 
 
just not going to worry about it. 
 
3.7 
 
I’ve gotten to the point 
where I have just dealt so bad. It was 
really an effort for me to get just get up 
out of the chair and walk 
to the bathroom and 
even back to the chair. 
 
I would be so out of breath. 
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I couldn’t go to church. 
 
It felt like I had 
hit rock bottom. 
 
He called some people and 
they came to the house. My very  
best friend her husband came and 
of course when she walked in the door 
and I saw her I started crying and 
she did too. I said, 
I just feel like I can’t go no more. 
 
We met at church. I’ve been praying 
for God to send me a special friend. God 
sent me you. And I have felt the same way. 
 
We are both very strong believers 
in Christ. She said  
God’s here and he is right  
with you and he is not going to let you 
down, and he is not going to let you 
down.  
 
They prayed with us, and she 
got me back up. That’s what friends 
are for. God sends you 
your wonderful friends and he knows 
just what you need and 
right when you need it.  
 
He is always right on time.  
 
3.8 
 
When he finally told me 
the day we were sitting in there and 
he was giving me my choices and 
he said you would have six months to live,  
I couldn’t get past that. I sat in the room  
in a daze, in shock. My mind wouldn’t go past 
that. My mind wasn’t thinking anything  
right then. 
 
It took me awhile. I just 
said let me get a hold of myself. 
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We got through it, and 
we’re here now. 
 
3.9 
 
Okay, this 
is it. Now we’ve got to 
face this. This is something 
we’ve got to face.  
 
He has shown us the good  
side. He has also shown us the bad 
side. I am glad he did. He could have 
just hem-hawed around about the bad 
side, not said anything, and 
I like that he was just so completely honest with us.  
 
Yes, that’s what I like. And 
it has really helped us. 
 
We’re doing it. And 
we are doing it together as family with 
God. God is bringing us closer 
together. And he is. 
 
Your main source that you can turn to 
is God.  
 
Patient 4 (63-year old white male, Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia) 
 
4.1 
 
It’s funny, because 
chemotherapy makes you,  
roller coaster ride.  
 
You’re emotional. Sometimes you want 
to cry and at other times you want  
to fight. It’s an up 
     and down 
thing.  
 
We would sit together 
and discuss the things 
that we were going through,  
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the things that we were feeling, 
the emotions. Emotions  
 
just are unbelievable. Unbelievable.  
 
4.2 
 
So I went over to the hospital. And 
as sure as God 
made little green apples,  
 
I didn’t have any red blood cells. I 
didn’t have any platelets. I 
had a whole bunch of white blood cells 
that weren’t any good. And  
two hours later I was getting a blood 
transfusion. 
 
That’s how we found out that 
I had leukemia.  
 
What do you mean 
I have cancer? I can’t have cancer,  
I’m not even sick! Yeah you are 
boy, you just don’t know it. 
 
There is some time frame there that you don’t remember. 
 
4.3 
 
That’s what children 
get. As my wife said,  
that’s just more proof 
that I am in my second  
childhood.  
 
So now I’m sixty-three years 
old. I’m laying flat on my back 
in a hospital 
for a month. This stuff has got to 
put me back into remission so 
I can have a bone marrow transplant. 
  
My long term prognosis 
requires it. Without it  
I don’t have a long term. 
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I’m probably going to be incapacitated 
for a total of a year. I’m afraid. 
 
I’m not afraid of being dead. I’m a Christian 
and I know where I’m going. I’m not worried about 
it. I’m not real excited 
about the process 
of getting there. 
 
4.4 
 
She told me I had 
six months. When I told him that,  
he got very upset. He said 
she don’t even know for sure 
what you got! How could she tell you  
you got six months? 
 
I grew up down 
in southwestern Oklahoma. Down 
in that part of the world, the most influential people 
are the farmers. They got wheat farmers down 
there that have 
thousands and thousands and thousands 
of acres of wheat. And my doctor looks just like 
one of those wheat farmers.  
 
I made that comment to him one day, and 
I realized that he might think that that was being derogatory 
but it wasn’t. It was being very complimentary. 
 
Because they know what they are doing and 
they run the show and 
they are professionals and 
that’s what he is.  
 
I have an awful lot of faith in him. 
 
I have an awful lot of faith 
in him. And won’t tell you that he’s God.  
But I think he calls Jesus Christ and the disciples 
JC and the Boys. He’s a pretty good 
guy. He really is. 
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I told him all things being equal 
I want to be as close to him  
as I can be as I go through this.  
 
I didn’t realize it was going to be 
as long as it is, but 
it’s all right. I can handle it. 
 
For awhile, anyway. 
 
4.5 
 
I work in maintenance 
and engineering. I fix things 
that are broken. Don’t try to tell me 
or keep me in the dark, tell me 
what’s going on. I can handle that. 
 
I can’t handle what I don’t know. 
 
I’m not a doctor. I can fix 
any machine that’s out there, although 
I think of it as kind of like a machine. 
I expect it to do certain things. The problem is 
if I’ve got bad fluid in a machine, I drain it out,  
change the filters, put in new fluid, 
and go down the road.  
 
It don’t work quite that way with the human body.  
 
I deal with things that are broken, 
don’t work, need correction, that’s all 
I’ve ever done. The only way I know how 
is to get as much information as I can. 
 
If you got information, you can deal with it.  
If you don’t have the information,  
you don’t know. 
 
And that’s what you can’t fight, what you don’t know. 
 
4.6 
 
Okay, let me tell you 
how tired you get. How weak 
you get.  
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My wife took me in to take a shower. 
I had to have help. Which is quite all right 
with me, I rather enjoyed it. Sick, but still 
a grown man and all that stuff. 
 
She gets me in the shower and 
we get al.l through and 
I am all cleaned up. Got no hair, so it’s not like 
it takes a long time to shampoo your hair. 
 
You just wash your face longer.  
 
I got through and she helped me get dried off,  
and I was too weak  
to put my under drawers on. I had to stop 
and sit down. That’s pretty weak. 
 
That’s pretty weak. 
 
4.7 
 
It hurts, but 
they don’t want to hurt 
you. They’re sorry that it hurts 
but there’s nothing 
  
they can do about it.  
 
4.8 
 
I’m not a young kid but 
I’m also not old. They talk about treatment 
associated with your age, and they’re not saying  
we won’t do thing because of your age, but, 
they go around that 
as a thought. 
 
Don’t count me out because  
I’m sixty-three. I intend to be around 
a while and I’ve got a lot of things 
I want to do yet. 
 
I can still put in a hard days’ work like I could 
when I was 40 years old. 
 49 
4.9 
 
It’s embarrassing. You lose 
all—there is no such thing 
as modesty. You just don’t have it. 
But as life goes on, life 
goes on.  
 
Now all of the things that I do and 
all the things that I worry about,  that’s  
your new normal. That’s what you have to learn.  
You learn to expect to go to the doctor, expect 
going to the hospital. That’s what you’re going  
to be doing the rest of your life.  
 
Because you got cancer.  
And cancer’s forever.  
 
You don’t get rid of it. It’s  
there. You might live a long,  
long time with it,  
but it’s there.   
 
4.10 
 
They were doing it 
every two weeks, then it went 
to once a month, then 
a couple of times  
every six weeks, then back 
to once a month. All of a sudden 
  
I had an odd reading. It’s called blasts. 
I didn’t have then for thirteen months  
and then I did.  
 
You’ve relapsed. That’s a totally 
different thing. What do you mean 
I’ve relapsed? I’ve been in remission for a year.  
 
I’ve had the medication, it did the job,  
it took care of the cancer cells. But it didn’t. And 
you don’t know and 
you don’t understand. 
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The measles and the mumps, you know 
what to expect, and when it’s over,  
it’s over. Well, with cancer,  
 
that’s not the way it is 
 
4.11 
 
I don’t know any other way 
to explain it. You cry like a baby, 
for no reason. And you get mad.  
 
I know why you get mad. You  
don’t feel like you can fight it.  
I’ve always been 
 
I TAKE CARE OF THINGS. I’m the guy 
who is gonna get it done. I’ll take care of it, 
whether it be work, or at home, or whatever.  
 
And now all of a sudden, I can’t. 
 
4.12 
 
Every month I would be back 
in the hospital for four days. They would 
whack me with chemo and I would go home 
and start feeling like I was human again. 
 
You start to feel good? Good, come on 
back, we’ll fix that! And you come back 
in the hospital, and they’d give you 
another whack of chemo, and you’d feel 
like you could die but 
 
you’d have to get better. You feel bad 
then you start to recover. 
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4.13 
 
Ask questions.  
Ask questions. Ask  
every dumb question  
you can think of. Find out  
all you can about the diagnosis.  
Then go back and ask more  
questions.  
 
Recognize what your patients can handle 
and tell them. I recognize 
that every patient is different. If you understand  
your patients ability to deal with 
     their illness,  
give them all that they are capable of handling.  
 
4.14 
 
She’s there, she supports 
me, she worries 
about me, wants me to get more sleep, 
eat the right things, do 
the right exercises. Don’t want to get out 
in the cold, don’t want to catch cold. 
 
All the things that someone that loves you 
does, everyday. And we’ve been married 
a long time, forty-four years. And I had 
 
in my mind to live one day longer than her, because  
I don’t want her to have to know what it is like. And now 
I’m afraid I can’t do that.  
 
If everything works well, we’ll sell our place 
here, and we’ll go there and buy us a little old 
house. Live close to family and  
 
pick guitars and 
sing. 
 
4.15 
 
I broke a lot of things. I had 
rotator cuff surgery four times, I broke 
my left wrist, I cut  
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my left thumb off, I tore 
a muscle in my leg, I kind of beat 
myself up a little bit, my left forearm was broken 
when I was a kid. 
 
I smoked for 34 years 
 
and I don’t think that had anything at all to do with what’s happened to me. 
 
Patient 5 (22-year old white female, ovarian cancer) 
  
5.1 
 
She walked in the room and  
she said we found  
a mass.  
Of course when I heard  
mass  
I thought cancer 
 
and thought the world was ending. 
 
She walked out of the room. 
I didn’t have any time 
to question her further. I didn’t know 
if she was in shock too 
 
of what they found. 
 
5.2 
 
That’s when I found out it was cancer. I don’t know,  
we just cried. I mean  
I couldn’t even speak, I think,  
I just sat there and  
cried.  
 
The worst part, I think, 
was the actual diagnosis,  
when I found out. I was in denial,  
I didn’t want to believe it.  
I thought, no, they’re wrong, the doctors are 
wrong.  
 
I was just in denial. I just remember 
crying. It was probably 
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an hour’s drive home and I just remember 
crying the whole way  
home. 
 
5.3 
 
I lost my hair. 
One of my friends threw 
a hair-cutting party for me, so 
that was really nice. It made the process 
a lot easier. 
 
I could just imagine myself, sitting in a chair,  
my mom buzzing my hair,  
all alone,  
crying.  
 
I had really long hair. 
 
No one at the party 
had shaved it, but  
they all got haircuts.  
 
So that was nice.  
 
5.4 
 
After she made the diagnosis,  
she asked if it was all right 
to hug me and my mom. She wanted 
us to keep in touch and 
let her know 
what was going on. So she was really good 
even though we hadn’t had her 
as a doctor 
     for that long.  
 
I would have to say that 
she really did save my life  
right then  
because she found it 
     so early. 
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5.5 
 
He was more focused 
     on the medical. He was hard 
to understand. He knew 
I was a nurse and he tried 
to talk to me. I didn’t even understand 
some of those terms because I was still a student! And  
if I didn’t understand it, my family 
     was just as confused. 
 
When he explained it, he asked 
me to explain to him 
what he had explained to us 
back to him  
and I explained it.  
That’s when my mom started 
taking notes. 
 
He just wasn’t— 
I don’t want to say  
heartless, that’s not 
     the right word.  
 
Personable, he definitely wasn’t 
     personable.  
 
5.6 
 
If they had found results, they 
could have known, you know, could 
it possibly have come to my breast? so 
they could have told me, you 
should really consider a mastectomy, or 
a full hysterectomy. 
 
But since they didn’t find anything, it really 
doesn’t give them anything 
to go on.  
 
You can’t see that  
I had cancer. Besides losing my hair. 
Whereas the woman may  
or may not decide 
to have reconstructive surgery for her breasts, 
I have an incision on my stomach.  
 55 
Other than that, no one would know 
that I lost an ovary. 
 
Breast cancer: people could physically see that 
on the outside. 
 
5.7 
 
I was kind of down and 
wondering why,  
why did this happen? They 
can’t give you an answer. That’s  
kind of hard, one of the hardest things  
for me. Maybe I could prevent it 
if I knew why I got it in the first place? 
 
Maybe I am doing something daily 
that is causing this cancer? 
 
5.8 
 
The first time I was so, 
so positive. I am going to beat this.  
Now here it is, it has hit 
again. It has just been more trying 
to be as positive as what I was 
the first time. 
 
That is kind of what I am battling with 
right now. 
 
5.9 
 
I know it is hard 
for people 
who haven’t gone through it  
because they can’t empathize as much.  
 
They don’t know what they are going though  
exactly. They can read a medical book  
or a nursing book  
and get an idea, but 
you really don’t know  
until you’ve gone through it yourself. 
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I think that  
it comes with age too. Maybe they don’t know how to handle it  
or how to approach me.  
Even though I have cancer 
I am still your friend. I am still  
the same person.  
 
You truly do find out who 
your real friends are. They will 
be with you forever. 
 
That’s a good thing, I’ve realized.  
 
Patient 6 (38-year old white female, Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia) 
 
6.1 
 
My husband and I were pregnant 
with twins. There were some 
complications. We were having, 
I guess that would be me, 
  
was having sub-chronic hemorrhage. 
 
She said it could be one of 
three things. It could be a virus, something else 
that I can’t remember right now, and 
then she said leukemia.  
 
And I thought well, surely it’s not  
leukemia because I felt fine, I was pregnant 
and I was tired and 
fatigued and 
thought it was just due to being pregnant. 
 
She said make sure you bring someone 
with you. I should have known right then 
that it was more important than 
what I was thinking. 
 
She didn’t want me 
to go home. I did go home and say goodnight 
to my son. I’m going home. If they are going to keep me 
overnight I am going to say goodnight. 
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They said, we can wait, and  
I said no, tell me now, I just want 
to know. What is going on?  
 
It was a shock, 
     upsetting. 
 
It was hard because we were 
pregnant, and then also, cancer.  
We had worked so hard to getting pregnant, and we 
have tried for a long time. So 
 
angry and sad. Not the whole time, 
but frustrated. Just shocked. Are you kidding me?  
Holy cow, you know.  
 
Angry and sad. Probably mostly sad. We can’t 
not be angry. Wouldn’t you be angry? Just a little.  
 
Not at them, but at the situation.  
 
6.2 
 
In the whole process of things, 
we ended up losing the twins.  
 
It had already started the process 
of losing the twins. They were ten weeks old.  
 
And we had two double whammies,  
the cancer, and then 
losing the babies. 
 
I wanted to wait and 
they said no you can’t wait. I said, 
let’s just wait a while, and they said no, we can’t, 
if you were in your third trimester 
 
it would have been better.  
 
6.3 
 
They all made 
handmade flowers because  
you can’t have flowers in vases. 
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They sent them and they made me valentines and 
they sent them at home on a big poster board and  
they always pray. 
 
 So I made cookies on Sunday just before I came in 
because I was feeling really good and so I made two batches  
of chocolate chip cookies for sixty kids and 
 
I wrote thank you notes and 
I brought them into school and  
the kids think that’s really cool. 
 
6.4 
 
We got informed really well and 
if you didn’t understand something  
the doctors would explain it and 
we’ve gotten leukemia 101 like in college  
 
so we probably know more about it than  
we probably even wanted to know. I’m glad,  
I like to be informed. If it’s happening 
 
to you, you want to know what’s going on.  
 
You look up something, then  
you’re like Oh!  
you’re just like Ah!  
 
I’ve kind of concluded that I’m not going to look on the internet. 
 
6.5 
 
I need a purpose to not give 
up. Not that I don’t have a purpose 
to live, because I do. I have 
 
my family, and I’m not very old, and  
I want to live a long life and maybe 
someday be a grandma. So  
 
it’s good for me to get out and get up and 
come back and get ready and if I don’t feel so good,  
I might come back and lay down. 
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You just have to do normal things. You almost feel 
kind of cheated. You’re on the cancer journey and 
you’re following the rules and  
 
I have to do what the schedule says and 
it would just be nice to be able to have charge 
 
of my life again.  
 
6.6 
 
I’m done with the hair thing but 
I’ll be glad to get my hair back and 
my eyelashes and everything.  
 
I know that’s kind of vain. 
 
I had lunch with my son at school on Tuesday.  
I went Monday and he said my mom’s having lunch with me 
tomorrow, so I said okay. 
 
I had lunch with him Tuesday and then 
I came in here Wednesday.  
 
We’re sitting there, 
eating lunch with all the little second graders.  
He says,  
 
Mom! Show them your hair! Your hair’s coming back! 
And he’s trying to take my hat off. They wouldn’t have cared.  
He was excited that my hair was coming back. I don’t know. 
 
He didn’t really say.  
 
6.7 
 
I went out after we shaved my 
head. I met a friend for lunch.  
 
I had a baseball hat on and we had a server, and 
it was a girl! A young girl. I found that  
 
she’d look at me and then, if you were my friend, she’d 
look at you almost like she didn’t want to look at me because 
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she didn’t want me to think that she was looking at me. And 
she was a girl too! I didn’t think anything of it until 
 
halfway through and then I told my girlfriend:  
now watch when she comes back, she’s not going to really talk to me 
 
or look at me! She will, and then she’ll look at you.  
And she did. 
 
6.8 
 
I took my hat off. I thought oh, 
I don’t care, I was hot. When it gets warmer 
I might not have anything on my head so 
I might as well see the shock factor! Of course 
I had some makeup on, powder. I tried to put mascara 
on, with what my eyelashes are. 
 
I got more double takes from the men than 
I did the women. There was one 
older man. He kind of did a double take. 
 
They just kind of look at you and 
then look away.  
 
I went to Macy’s and there was a lady in there, 
she works in the watch section. 
 
I was with my husband. He just likes to go  
with me. Before I could run errands by myself. 
 
He’ll make sure that I’m not out too long. This lady walks up 
behind me and she puts her hand on my back and 
she says 
“are you a survivor?” 
and I say “what do you mean?” and  
she goes “are you a breast cancer survivor?” 
 
People think when you have cancer they mostly associate it  
with that. You can’t see ovarian,  
you can’t see leukemia. 
 
Well, yes, I’m a survivor, but no, it’s not breast cancer. You’re 
a survivor from day one, so from the day 
you are diagnosed, you’re a survivor 
and you’re a fighter, and you have to have hope 
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and faith, because if you don’t,  
it’s just not good. 
 
When people ask you, how are you feeling  
I thought, do I really tell them how I’m feeling? Or 
do I just say pretty good? So sometimes I just say pretty good, or  
good. 
 
That’s all that’s expected.  
 
I’ve had a couple friends go, you’re lying, you 
don’t feel pretty good. They can tell by looking at you.  
 
That lady at Macy’s was a breast cancer survivor.  She’s 
 amazing too. 
 
6.9 
 
So I want to know 
everything. The good and 
the bad, and 
the percentages, and the odds and  
what are my chances for relapse.  
 
I just need to know. I can know, and  
then I know everything that’s going on, then 
I feel prepared, in case it does, and 
I just like to know. I mean,  
 
if it’s happening to you, wouldn’t you want to 
know? When it’s happening to you, you would 
remember every little thing. 
 
6.10 
 
It’s probably rough 
on him too. The days when I don’t feel so good or 
I’m sleeping or  
my head hurts so bad and he’ll ask me something and 
I can’t think because it hurts from here back to here, and 
he’ll want to know something to have my opinion, and 
I’ll answer him. I don’t know, I can’t really think. 
 
It’s got to be hard because he’s doing things 
that I would normally do. 
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Dinners. The bills. I’ll go home, and Oh my Gosh!  
This bill is due! And I had already lined them up, in order. Or  
I’ll try to make the house seem not so messy. I’ll do 
some laundry, what I can, and then the dishes and  
the dishwasher. Then I’ll come home, and  
things are the same as when I left them. 
 
Because he’s helping our son and  
they’re coming here and then by the time he does all that and 
he gets him home and gets him in the shower and  
he might put a load in and then he’s tired, because  
he worked, and he didn’t sleep, 
because they had fires all night. 
 
He’s dog tired.  
 
6.11 
 
Hope and faith,  
you should have hope and 
faith in god and hope that everything 
is going to be okay. 
 
I hope I’m going to be okay, and  
I hope my friend that has cancer 
is going to be okay because you don’t know. 
 
Nobody knows. 
 
When something isn’t right, you still  
are gonna think, is it just some cold, or  
am I feeling fatigued because I’m just tired, or 
is it low hemoglobin,  
 
why am I getting bruises? 
Is it low platelets again? 
 
And prayer. We have a lot of people saying prayers, and I 
think prayers are powerful. And I  
think the hardest thing is probably 
asking for help. 
 
People say if there’s anything, and 
     they’ll make ANYTHING really big! and  
they leave their number, call us. If I’ve 
read that once, I’ve read that a million times! And  
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it’s really nice. In the future if it happened,  
I would probably call and say,  
let me bring you dinner. I would probably call them directly.  
 
What day can I come? Not that I’m going to call I say 
can you bring me dinner? Because I’m not! 
 
We’ve had some friends say 
I’m bringing you dinner, what day can I come? 
 
6.12 
 
You feel like you’re out of control 
things were just so overwhelming 
people were coming in  
different types of people, talking to us,  
it was so overwhelming. 
 
Sometimes they come in rounds 
and there’s a bunch of them then the main doctor,  
the attending. 
 
They would come back, just them, and just talk to us 
when they didn’t have a bunch of people.  
 
With the doctors my husband asked a few questions 
in the beginning. He said I just wanted to know 
if they had a heart,  
 
you know?  
 
They’ll come up and talk to you, say 
how are you doing? Not because they had to 
talk to you, they didn’t have to talk to us. We were  
standing in the hallway because we were here in the clinic, 
they’re just very genuine. 
 
I’ve had doctors at other places  
I don’t get a good feeling 
you don’t feel comfortable.  
 
It’s just nice, you know they’re capable and 
they’re human, and  
 
     that’s what they’re like. 
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6.13 
 
Someone that’s compassionate, listens 
to the patient, and answers the patient’s 
questions. Sometimes if you ask a question  
they’ll give you an answer and then you leave 
and they totally didn’t answer what you wanted 
to know and you didn’t realize it 
until after you left. 
 
6.14 
 
We were eating breakfast. Our family doctor,  
he’s got a good bedside manner. Our son  
had seen the doctor walk in and 
it was across the room, and 
it was not a popular restaurant, it was just  
a little mom and pop pancake house.  
 
He said can I say hi? and I said just wait.  
He was with his family. 
 
Part of the way through, he asked again, and I said 
sure you can go say Hi, so he went and said Hi, and  
the doctor was looking around to see where we were. 
We waved and he gets up and walks back and  
comes to our table and sits down and talks,  
he sits right next to me. 
 
He sat down and he just chatted with us, which 
he didn’t have to do. He could have just waved. He said  
I wanted to see how you were doing. I honestly think 
if I wasn’t sick he still  
would have come over and 
said hi because he was just so 
     genuine. 
 
They don’t have to come and  
talk to you for a long time. Just that initial 
hey, and they shake your hand,  
how are you today, let me tell you what I found out.  
You’re doing great and this isn’t so great.  
 
Stuff like that.  
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6.15 
 
I think it’s good  
to have a good attitude,  
number one. Of course  
nothing’s perfect. When is this 
going to be over? Am I going  
to be okay? Everybody else 
that’s gotten sick  
thinks the same thing. 
 
Why did this happen to me?  
I was fine. I’ve never been sick 
in my life. 
 
We are very happy. Under the circumstances. I mean 
life is good. Everyday is a beautiful day,  
honestly. I mean why not? 
 
Some people have a harder time. 
 
Patient 7 (53-year old white male, Hodgkin’s Lymphoma) 
 
7.1 
 
I was bound to the bed, I was stuck  
 
in bed, I was very weak.  
All I could do was stay in bed.  
Sick to my stomach  
     constantly.  
It totally wrecked my bodily functions. So it was very uncomfortable, 
drenched in sweat, and I would get up out of bed, 
 
     and I would be freezing cold 
 
7.2 
 
You have lymphatic  
     cancer. 
 
And sure, it took me by surprise, I kind of started 
asking questions like, what? who, me? why?  
is it because of my smoking? No, no, no.  
Are you sure it’s not? Could it have to do 
     with my lungs?  
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It is just out of the blue.  
It picked me to land on. I had questions like,  
     is this genetic? Did it come from my family, or is it  
     just pure luck of the draw? 
 
It came at me kind of quick and  
caught me by surprise. How would you feel  
if you found out you had  
twenty-five percent chance to live?  
 
That’s set me back pretty good. I had it 
     bad. Anyway, it came back  
again. That first round of treatment  
wasn’t enough.  
 
7.3 
 
Now this time it will be different  
because he has already told me up front, he says 
my chances are much less, you know,  
that you will succeed and survive.  
You could die from it, or you know,  
it could cure you.  
I only have about a one in five, 
a one in four chance. That’s kind of  
     hard to swallow.   
 
7.4 
 
If I had a twin of me  
that had the same thing happen 
     what would I tell that person?  
I would tell him don’t ever give up. It’s a disease,  
it’s one of the curses of mankind,  
of humanity,  
but we have doctors who are smart, 
and they know how to fight it, and they do  
and they will  
but it takes you too. You can’t just say, all right,  
give me the drugs. You have to fight yourself. But  
     what would I tell him? Just don’t ever give up.  
There is always hope  
somewhere. 
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7.5 
 
Day to day,  
what is on my mind the most  
day to day  
is relief from the discomfort, the pain, the inability 
     to do things, 
how it’s damaged my body and  
disabled my body. I can’t live  
the normal life that I used to live.  
 
I am not complete,  
I am not whole 
because I am disabled 
to a point where I am limited 
as to what I can do physically. 
 
And of course,  
     pain.  
 
7.6 
 
Thank God for the doctors,  
because they are helping me, and  
they have the know-how. I’ve got the guts and the will power and 
they have all the brains and 
the tools to do it. Combined,  
 
I hope we can kick it.  
 
I trust his experience and  
his knowledge. He’s been doing what he does and 
I trust his judgment, I’ve been kind of  
following his lead.  
 
7.7 
 
I was a little bug that  
got stepped on 
     by some big thing. And  
I’m just so small  
and defenseless and 
I just got in the way of something bigger  
     than me. 
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Oh well,  
such is life,  
but I don’t let those feelings hang around 
     in my head 
 very long.  
 
Patient 8 (53-year old white male, non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, T Cell Lymphoma) 
 
8.1 
 
They saved my life here.  
First of all.  
 
And after they saved my life,  
     they’ve been nothing but 
courteous. 
 
It’s like night and day.  
It’s like night and day.  
 
I would have rather not needed it,  
but I wouldn’t be anywhere  
else. 
 
8.2 
 
I was at work.  
Pouring concrete,  
got a phone call on my cell phone, 
     doctor.  
 
He said 
what are you doing? and I said  
pouring concrete. 
 
     and he started laughing. He goes,  
have you ever heard of lymphoma? And I go, 
yeah. Yeah, I have. He goes,  
that’s what you got. And I go,  
all right.  
 
Now what? 
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8.3 
 
At least he didn’t tell me I was going to die  
anytime soon.  
 
You still got cancer. 
you don’t know how bad it is.  
you can’t make any decisions.   
you are scared.  
of the unknown.  
     The unknown scares anybody. But you don’t know.  
     What you don’t know, just freaks you out.  
Especially when it is something to do with your life. 
 
Shocked me a little. You would have thought, 
     hey,  
I need to see you in my office,  
we have some things to discuss. 
 
It seemed like he tells people this  
     everyday. This  
is what he does  
     everyday.  
 
And I accepted it  
     as that. 
 
Didn’t really bother me  
     that much. It didn’t really bother me  
that much. But  
I could see how it would bother some people.  
But it didn’t me.  
 
8.4 
 
I knew something was wrong. The patient 
will know something is wrong with his body 
before you will.  
 
And I surely do believe that.  
There are a few doctors here who agree with me—  
he tells me that right now,  
you know more about your body 
than I do. And he’s right. 
I believe him.  
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Listen to your patient. Listen to your patient.  
Don’t overlook anything. Don’t overlook anything. 
 
8.5 
 
Stay positive, all the good thoughts. 
all of the above, stay positive,  
keep thinking the good things.  
 
You start thinking bad things, things  
will go down the other way with you. I know,  
I’ve been both ways, I’ve swung 
both ways, and when  
I think of good things,  
 
my day goes much better.  
 
Patient 9 (36-year old white female, Multiple Myeloma) 
 
9.1 
 
I said, 
okay, I said  
are you concerned? and  
the nurse said no, and I said 
okay, in my mind, if you’re not that concerned 
then I’m not going to be that concerned  
why create a bill if I don’t have to because 
I obviously don’t have money to pay for it, 
     so I didn’t go back. 
 
you really didn’t seem concerned 
and neither was I. I will get there 
when I get there.  
You will really need to show me other reasons why  
I should go have this done. 
 
9.2 
 
The drug she put me on 
stopped working a month or two after 
she put me on it.  
     So I went through a couple of extra months of chemo 
without any thing good coming out of it 
because it stopped working. I started it in September 
and it stopped working in October 
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I went through all of November and 
all of December  
for no reason.  
 
She never caught it. 
 
January 
I was kind of on my own. 
I didn’t have no doctors. I didn’t know really what 
I was going to be doing or where 
I was going to wind up, so then  
I pretty much went through  
no chemo at all. 
 
I was kind of on my own. 
 
9.3 
 
My doctor thought 
I was getting ready to go through my stem cell transplant. 
He ran his tests to make sure that  
     we are still up for that and  
     that’s where we are at and  
     explained to me the whole process and 
     I went to a class and 
     learned about it, and 
he did his blood work and said no 
we can’t do that because your levels are not good and 
we are going to have to put you back on 
chemo. 
 
They ran a blood test and 
it came back that it wasn’t working and 
 
my cancer is aggressive and 
 
that’s two now that don’t work, or  
that worked in the beginning and 
     then quit. 
 
9.4 
 
When I got diagnosed with cancer  
my protein level was 4030, then 
my protein level went up to 5120  
before they caught it, then 
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my total protein was 6120. 
after a month the cancer just kind of ate it and 
didn’t do anything else with it, so 
out of 6120, 5510 of that  
good protein and the bad protein,  
the good protein that your body uses and 
the bad protein that is the cancer, 
out of that 6000, 5510 is all bad cancer, so 
I went from 80% up to 92% 
cancer of the blood 
 
9.5 
 
You see so many doctors 
everyday. 
You don’t get to see your original doctor 
except for the day you have an appointment 
but you see all these other ones. 
It’s kind of confusing.  
 
You have all these doctors  
in training.  
It is hard to question 
what they are doing because 
they wouldn’t have made it this far if 
they didn’t know what they were doing. 
 
I guess I am not really one to ask  
questions. 
 
That’s their profession.  
They know what they are doing so 
why question it? 
 
I kind of just let them do what they think is best  
whether it matches up with the day before. Maybe 
something’s changed and they didn’t tell me, and 
that’s why the plan the next day is something 
totally different. 
 
Like yesterday I was told something totally different 
than today. 
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9.6 
 
His father 
is not involved 
which is a blessing. We left  
a domestic violence situation: 
     alcoholic, verbal, physical, emotional,  
left him to get away from that. 
 
I have a child to protect.  
 
His dad knows I have cancer and, 
     one day, 
he’ll put the bottle down and 
offer help. 
 
My son doesn’t ask for him, and 
I don’t speak about him, and 
     that’s about it.  
 
9.7 
 
I found out that 
I was adopted when 
I was twelve, living in Chicago, coming home 
from the grocery store. The cashier said 
you can really tell you are mother and daughter 
     because you both look alike. We got out to the car, and 
my mom put my brother and I in the back seat, looked 
in the rear-view mirror, and said 
I have something to tell you guys,  
you’re adopted.  
 
I was like okay. And then we went on home,  
put groceries away, and then went on with our day.  
Nothing else was ever spoken about it.  
 
My parents that adopted me were not the best, but  
we all move on. 
 
9.8 
 
I wanted to be fixed after 
I had my son, and 
they wouldn’t do that. They told me 
some story. You might meet 
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the man of your dreams. 
If we fix you now, we can’t reverse it. 
  
I said, 
unless you plan on coming home with me 
to help me take care of these kids until  
the man of my dreams 
shows up, fix it! And they wouldn’t do it. 
 
I’ve never been  
married. I don’t plan on getting 
married. I got one child on my hip, I don’t need 
another on the couch too.  
 
9.9 
 
He knows Mommy’s sick, but 
he doesn’t know the full term 
cancer.  
 
We try to sit down and  
talk to him,  
 
he doesn’t call me Mommy, he calls me Nana. 
 
He’s like Nana, 
you don’t look sick. 
  
I’m sick honey, you 
just can’t see. I have to go to the doctor and 
there’s going to be times I am going to have to stay away 
for them to take care of me. There’s going to be times when 
I have to stay away for awhile. 
 
So he knows little pieces, but 
I am all that he has.  
 
I have my moments when 
he goes to bed when 
I cry. That would be my low point. 
 
I have a child that depends on me. So  
     he is my high point.  
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9.10 
 
Two weeks after I get home  
I will lose my hair. I’m not too crazy 
about that. 
 
Some women, they don’t care, but 
to some women,  
the hair is everything. I don’t care  
what I’m wearing, or if I don’t match, or  
if I don’t have makeup on, or whatever, but  
as long as my hair looks good when I go outside,  
I’m okay!  
 
No hair in two weeks. I’m not too crazy 
about that. 
 
9.11 
 
She was kind of flighty. Kind of 
flakey. She never sat still. Every time  
we talked about my ailment she 
never looked me in the eye.  
 
It was always all around the room. 
 
Oh, you got cancer. I’m like okay, 
I’m right here. And every time 
I asked about blood work, she said, 
I don’t know. I need to check. I need to look it up.  
I’ll get back with you.  
 
Sometimes I don’t want to be a name 
on a billboard in the doctor’s office, 
     a number. 
 
She asked if I wanted a second opinion, she said 
I understand if you do.  
 
I have cancer here. Most likely 
if I go to another doctor,  
I will have cancer 
     there too. 
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I might as well stay here. Why pay 
for the same answer  
     twice?  
 
9.12 
 
They say God 
will only give you  
what you can handle. I think  
I got my fill. And they say 
what doesn’t kill you  
makes you stronger. Did I ask for this? No. 
Did half these people  
in the hospital 
ask for what they got?  
 
9.13 
 
I think my body’s 
adjusted to it 
pretty well. That’s 
some pretty harsh stuff 
that they give us. Heavy 
duty stuff.  
 
It’s not Dymatapp from Walmart.  
 
Our bodies are able to take it in 
and use it for what it’s for. 
 
The body is a pretty amazing thing.  
 
Patient 10 (69-year old white woman, colon cancer) 
 
10.1 
 
I am a person who has never been sick. 
I had no symptoms whatsoever 
It was kind of a shock. 
I was told on the phone. 
Luckily my middle daughter was  
with me 
at the time, and so what I did was just 
hand her the phone. 
I don’t know whether that is quite the best way to do it.  
But it was quite a shock— 
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I had, you know, no inkling  
that this is what I was 
going to hear.  
 
I wish that my doctor had  
had me get a colonoscopy, before,  
because they could have caught it. Like I said  
I had no symptoms.  
 
10.2 
 
The only thing was—  
my mother had a fall when she was fifty-one 
     and was a paraplegic.  
she was paralyzed from just below her chest  
     and she lived for eleven years.  
 
She was bed-ridden for  
     eleven years. And 
she was a remarkable woman. She never complained.  
 
I don’t know whether being around her made me strong. I hadn’t really 
     thought about it. 
 
10.3 
 
There are a lot of times when I think, how could I be so sick and feel so good?  
So I don’t think about it 
     a lot. 
 
They say I amaze them, but it’s just,  
it’s just a way of life, it’s just  
something that I have to do, and I know  
the outcome is not very good, but like I said,  
I live one day at a time, and  
the people around 
     make it a lot easier. 
 
you know  
when I come in for chemo, and you know,  
they’ve got their smiling faces, and they know 
who you are, and they remember,  
     and that’s important. 
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So, I think that is the main thing,  
and it’s weird, 
     but I look forward to it. 
 
I know that the cancer that I have, it’s terminal,  
     and it’s stage four,  
     but I’ll tell you what,  
     I’m going to live as long as I can and as well as I can! 
 
So you know  
overall 
      it hasn’t been that bad of an experience! 
 
 
10.4 
 
She can’t figure out where I went  
because when I came to the hospital,  
I was coming to pick up medicine, not  
     to remain here.  
 
I had had a Golden Retriever before this one 
for eleven years 
and had to have him put to sleep,  
 
     he had cancer. 
 
10.5 
 
I’m going to lose my hair. 
I never thought I was a vain person.  
     I’m afraid I am!  
So I’m not looking forward to that, and you know 
     having that happen, having things hit you, having a bunch of stuff hit you  
all at once  
     is a little overwhelming.  
 
That was the first time that I really cried or got upset. 
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Thematic Analysis 
 I will provide some analysis of the poetry below; a closer analysis of the themes 
and outcomes could be another project. I do not intend to claim that all patient illness 
narratives out of which poetry might be found contains these themes, though it is possible 
to group poems by themes rather than by patient-subject. Many poems fit under several 
themes. It is also not my intention for this project to draw any conclusions based on 
theme; my work is more about the narratives and the method than about any specific 
analysis of the poems themselves. It would have been interesting to have patient feedback 
on the poetry that was derived from their narratives, but soliciting their feedback directly 
was not anticipated in my Institutional Review Board paperwork, and is therefore not 
allowed. My focus is the narratives within the poetry that can inform ethicists and 
physicians, therefore patient feedback does not fall neatly into my equation. 
 
Offering Advice and Regaining Control 
 Many of my participants offer advice, both to other patients who find themselves 
in similar situations, and to physicians. Herwaldt’s patients, who had already written 
about their experiences, and who might have had a pre-conceived agenda coming into 
their interviews, might not have needed as much prodding for stories and material; some 
of my subjects did and some did not. The prodding came in the form of questions 
designed to inspire them to speak more about their illness experiences. I asked a question 
about offering advice to themselves in the past, to others in similar situations, and to 
student doctors and nurses, and that is most likely why such content is present in so many 
of the poems. Regardless, such coaching works in a couple of ways. First, the patient can 
guide him or herself through the experience, and second, the patient can express a desire 
to help others going through similar trials. This invitation to help others can also assist 
patients in transcending their own circumstances, giving them a pragmatic goal on which 
to focus. They also could have found it more difficult to speak about themselves; for 
example, patient seven was much more forthcoming when given the opportunity to speak 
to others. Patient one was very new in his diagnosis, and he offered advice to others on  
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the little he had already experienced. Offering advice to others is also a way to regain 
control by focusing attention on a single task. The loss of control is a theme often present 
in illness narrative. 
 These subjects also attempted to regain control of their situations by trying to 
reconcile disparate and seemingly conflicting parts of their lives. Charon and Montello 
(2001) write about using narrative in medicine to repair broken life stories—one’s life 
narrative is chaotically interrupted in the face of illness. By tying up loose ends and 
reconnecting the past and the present along a life continuum, disrupted life narratives are 
reconciled and the ill person regains some measure of control.  Indeed for Frank (1995), 
“people define themselves in terms of their body’s varying capacity for control...Illness 
[itself] is about learning to live with lost control” (30). Sharing illness narrative is an 
exercise in regaining control. Frank’s (1995) narrative wreckage—a life in need of 
narrative repair—is similar. Illness narrative has to “repair the damage that illness has 
done to the ill person’s sense of where she is in life, and where she might be going” (53). 
Illness interrupts a life, and illnesses “happen in a life that already has a story, and this 
story goes on” regardless (54). One of my patient-subjects uses his narrative to reconcile 
the stark contrast of finding out he has cancer while pouring concrete (8.2). Others speak 
about the disconnect between feeling well and being desperately ill.  
 Denial also plays a role in dealing with the loss of control that comes with illness. 
Some patients do not directly address any loss of control in their own lives. Some face it 
head-on: noting it, complaining about it, and mourning it. For many, it is connected with 
gender. Patients 5, 6, 9, and 10 reflect on losing their hair and other physical changes that 
challenge their femininity. Patient 6 talks about losing both her role as primary caregiver 
for her son, and her pregnancy due to her illness. Patients 1, 2, and 4 talk about how their 
masculinity is challenged as they lose their strength and their status as breadwinner to 
their cancer, and how they must be cared for by others. Both men and women express the 
vulnerability that comes with illness. Patients 6 and 9 tell stories about their lives 
tangential to their illnesses. While I might have prompted them with questions, I would 
have likewise prompted others who did not disclose more about their lives unrelated to 
their cancer.  
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I could speculate: they might be afraid of dying and see the interview as a chance to take 
stock of their lives thus far, they could just be naturally more inclined to think of their 
illnesses in the contexts of the rest of their lives, or they could just be people who are 
more open.  
 
Metaphor 
 In my discussion of poetry and medicine, I included metaphor as an important 
convention in both poetry and in pathography. There is certainly metaphor in my “found” 
poetry and it warrants mention. Patients recall being diagnosed with cancer as running 
into a brick wall. Chemotherapy and emotion that comes with having a potentially life-
ending disease is described as being on a roller-coaster ride. One patient talks about 
fighting his disease as if it were a violent invader. Another talks about feeling like a little 
bug being crushed by something larger. Some patients naturally moved into metaphoric 
language, and others did not. It is difficult to speculate on the reasons without being able 
to follow up with the patients. They might naturally think and speak in metaphor, as part 
of their temperament, or they might not. They might feel that metaphor is the only way to 
approach their fear and desperation, when more conventional words fail them. Patients 2, 
3, 4, and 7 fall into metaphoric language more often than the others. I am not sure if I 
would be willing to assert that those poems that involve metaphor are better than the 
others, or stronger. They are different, and compelling in different ways. Those without 
metaphor are powerful in their starkness, their frankness, and their honesty.  
 
Faith in God and in Medicine 
 Faith, religion, and God are repeating themes for nearly all of the patients whom I 
interviewed, to differing degrees. Again, it is difficult to speculate: were these patients 
religious before they became ill? Has their illness led them to rely on God in new ways? 
Are they afraid to express doubt now, when they need a higher power most of all, when 
they most feel out of control? Do they need to maintain faith in order to maintain 
optimism? All of these ideas are possible. There are interesting parallels between faith in 
medicine and in doctors and in God. Patient 3 asserts over and over again the role that 
God has in her life. Patients thank God for their doctors (7.6) and compare their doctors 
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to God (4.4). Maybe, like patient 9, they feel like they have no choice but to have faith in 
their doctors, who hold their greatest chance for survival.  
 
Relational Autonomy and Patient Ways of Knowing 
 Key to the goal for my Patient Listening project is both the feminist conception of 
relational autonomy and the potential for legitimizing patients’ narrative ways of 
knowing. While I will explicate these ideas further in sections below, I want to show 
evidence of these ideas within my poetic research results. While principlist autonomy has 
autonomous agents acting on their own behalf without external influence, relational 
autonomy takes into account how differing degrees of autonomy are possible, and only so 
in social contexts. My poems reflect the roles that social and familiar relationships play in 
daily lives of my patient-subjects and in their decision-making. My patients are mothers 
and friends, husbands and wives who have kids. They struggle to reconcile their own role 
losses, as they are unable to take care of their children, spouses, their dogs, and even 
themselves. They have relationships with their doctors and with God. These relationships 
color everything they do as people, healthy and well. Those around them color their 
understanding of their conditions and their treatments and all of their decision-making. 
They are players in social webs of interaction; they do not make decisions as atomistic 
and independent autonomous entities. These patients are relationally autonomous. 
 My patient-subjects also seek to legitimize their ways of knowing, which might 
differ from those of their caregivers, as in Western medical culture it is the perspective of 
the physician that is prioritized. What is true is what the empirical and scientific data tell 
us. However, one patient knew he was sick before his physician did (2.2). Another makes 
an explicit claim that a patient knows what is going on with his own body before his 
doctor does (8.4). It is this knowing that I seek to legitimize. A physician must be trusted 
by his patient in order to have a successful outcome; a physician trusting his patient can 
likewise improve the healing encounter.   
 The patients that I interviewed doubtlessly accomplished cultural and medical 
work. Beyond assisting me in learning to listen more closely and allowing me to share 
my creative results in an academic setting, they have assisted me in making a case for 
new ways of knowing and for a different concept of autonomy from what is currently 
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dominant in medical ethics. Some might have regained some measure of control in their 
own lives by sharing their stories,  reconciling disparate parts of their lives, and advising 
others. Some might have been able to work beyond denial, beginning to size up their 
situation in ways that could help them heal psychically or physically. They might have 
become more aware of the work of their bodies during a time that it might feel alien even 
to them. The interview process could have provided them an outlet, a vent, or a channel 
for the terrible fear and anxiety that they must be experiencing, allowing them to gain 
insight and to face the terrible realities of their treatments and even their possible 
mortality. It is difficult to stand by such bold claims, especially when I am not able to 
follow-up with the patients themselves, but I can be hopeful. 
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6.0 FEMINIST BIOETHICS AND NARRATIVE 
 
 Clinical and feminist ethics are similar in their attention to case context, empathy, 
and legitimacy of narrative. However, there are aspects of feminist ethical theory3 that are 
not thoroughly delineated in clinical ethics—specifically, attention to power imbalances 
in medical structures and variations in ethical perspectives. When my poems are 
examined using a feminist bioethical framework, my subjects (and other patients) are 
empowered by expanding both the idea of justice and the principlist definition of 
autonomy to include the feminist conception of relational autonomy. This feminist 
relational model of autonomy differs from the standard conception of autonomy in 
medical ethics generally couched in informed consent.4 Many feminist philosophers have 
criticized principlist autonomy as placing a premium on the potentially masculine ideals 
of independence and self-sufficiency to the detriment of values of relations like care and 
connection (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). Relational autonomy is premised on the 
fundamentally feminist idea that persons are socially embedded, and that identity of 
agents and behaviors are influenced within the context of social ties. Autonomy is simply 
not possible without social relationships with family, friends, and caregivers—it is not 
possible in a traditional ethical vacuum, which follows from the feminist criticism of the 
traditional ethical self as independent and atomistic. Justice as a bioethical ideal also 
stands to gain with feminist ethical insight. Feminist theory pays attention to justice on a 
different scale: for individuals and groups alike, justice for feminists means equality 
toward marginalized people and freedom from oppression. In my introduction, I took care 
to define “oppression” in this context. For the purposes of my research, eliminating 
oppression is embodied in the act of giving voice (via poems) to those whose voices had 
not yet been heard (my patient-subjects). In Western biomedicine, scientific and 
empirical ways of knowing—blood chemistry tests, imaging studies—alone hold 
authority as truth-tellers. The delegitimization of narrative or experiental patient ways of                                                         3 Ethics done from this perspective are feminIST, and not feminINE; both women and men can subscribe 
to feminist theory. Men can be feminist ethicists and women can be strict principlists. In order to prevent 
misunderstanding, it is key to point out that feminist ethics is not anti-male, and men have written on 
feminist topics.  
4 Meyers 1989, Keller 1997, McKenzie and Stoljar 2000. 
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knowing about their own bodies is suppression of a form of knowledge. Inclusion of this 
knowledge can enrich the success of the healing encounter.  
 As I assert above, illness itself is oppressive in that it prevents patients from 
expressing their full capabilities and living their lives as they choose. Without an 
understanding of a patient’s story, history, and perception of their own condition and 
body, a physician might be indirectly responsible for perpetuating a patient’s oppression 
by failing to eliminate illness. The feminist goal is to mitigate oppression, wherever it 
may be perceived.  
 
Bioethical Principlism 
 If philosophers and researchers are inclined to believe that ethics must “center on 
analyses of fine-grained distinctions, often so fine-grained that all moral content 
disappears,” Kuczewski (2007) warns that the potential exists that all discourse regarding 
potential ethical quandaries will “default to an assertion of autonomy” (419). Respect for 
autonomy is one of the four principles that guide discussion and debate of much of 
contemporary biomedical ethics, an approach referred to as “principlism.” According to 
principlism, human reason discovers, formulates, and applies a system of universally 
binding moral standards, and these four principles are “often invoked as moral absolutes 
that contain the solution to any medical dilemma” (Morris 2001, 58). These four 
principles put forth by Beauchamp and Childress (2001) are respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.  
 Autonomy is essentially freedom from interference, or literally, “self-rule” 
(Beauchamp and Childress 2001, 57). The bioethical principle of autonomy recognizes 
that a competent and rational individual has the right (and perhaps even the obligation) to 
make an informed choice about his or her own medical care. Autonomous individuals act 
intentionally, with understanding, and lack controlling influences, and to “respect an 
autonomous agent is, at a minimum, to acknowledge that person’s right to hold views, to 
make choices, and to take actions based on personal values and beliefs” (63). The 
embodiment of autonomy in medicine is not simply allowing patients to make their own 
decisions; the obligation exists for physicians and other healthcare workers to create the 
conditions that promote autonomous choice.  
 86 
 The bioethical principle of beneficence requires that medical professionals take 
steps to help others as a positive obligation, while balancing benefits and drawbacks in 
the interest of utility. Beneficence itself “refers to an action done to benefit others;” these 
actions can be taken to help prevent or remove harms or to improve the situation of others 
(166). Adherence to this principle requires that health care providers promote the “good,” 
acting in the best interests of the person for whom they are providing care. Paternalism, 
or the cognizant overriding of patient desire motivated by “doctor knows best,” exists as 
a conflict between beneficence and autonomy. In fact, “whether respect for the autonomy 
of patients should have priority over professional beneficence directed at those patients is 
a central problem in biomedical ethics” (176). 
 The principle of non-maleficence, or “first, do no harm,” dictates that “agents 
assert an obligation not to inflict harm on others” (113). While beneficence requires the 
active promotion of the good, non-maleficence “only requires intentionally refraining 
from actions that cause harm” (115). With respect to bioethical principlism, the principle 
of justice refers solely to the equitable social distribution of benefits and burdens. 
 
Criticism of Bioethical Principlism 
 Principlism is, essentially, based on the idea that ethics can be done with a set of 
four prima facie rules, conceived by reason, and handed down in order to derive an 
acceptable ethical conclusion from nearly any ethical conflict presented. A great deal of 
criticism of principlist theory, here articulated by Tong (1996), is that the principles are 
not moored in single universal moral theory, and that the principles (or any rule-like 
principles) are too removed from the concrete realities of human existence. For Sherwin 
(1989), there are likewise limitations to the restriction of ethical analysis to the level of 
general principles. She points to the need to focus instead on contextual details of cases to 
derive ethical conclusions. Held (1990) asserts that not “all moral problems [can] be 
handled by applying an impartial, pure, and rational principle,” or rules derivable from it 
(687). Such abstract principles cannot be applied in all contexts. For Held, principlist 
bioethical theory can be caricatured as “the advocacy of reason controlling unruly 
emotion, of rationality guiding responsible human action against the blindness of 
passion” (683). Donchin (2009) finds the theory formulated from the vantage point of 
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privileged groups only, and Groenhout (2004) views “rationality” to be often equivalent 
to the idealized perspective of elite males. While “abstract theories make a claim to 
neutrality,” it is only a claim (184). 
 Another key critique of principlism surrounds its exclusive focus on rational 
cognition. For Le Coz (2007): “on the one hand, emotions can alter our sense of 
discrimination and lead us to make our wrong decisions. On the other hand, it is known 
that lack of sensitivity can alter our judgment and lead us to sacrifice basic ethical 
principles, such as autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice,” which is an 
interesting paradox (470). Indeed, strictly “scientific and rational reoccupation cannot be 
sufficient to guarantee the ethical quality of the decision,” and here is the call to emotion 
(470). Principlism, and examples of both Kantian and utilitarian approaches to ethics, 
“share a reliance on a highly abstract, universal principles as the appropriate source of 
moral guidance, and both share the view that moral problems are to be solved by the 
application of such abstract principles... [these approaches] share an admiration for the 
rules of reason to be applied in moral contexts and both denigrate emotional responses to 
moral issues” (Held 1990, 687). 
 
Devaluing of Emotion in Favor of Reason 
 In philosophical discourse, emotion is often accused of getting in the way of a 
rational and reasoned argument. Held (1990) points out the rationalist belief that 
“emotional attitudes toward moral issues themselves interfere with rationality and should 
be disregarded” (687). Universal impartiality is valued and emotion must be removed in 
order to prevent its coloring of ethical conclusions, even if, paradoxically, “emotions are 
essential to doctors so that they remain sensitive to the great ethical principles” (Le Coz 
2007, 471). This hyper-rational devaluing of emotion in bioethical decision-making 
ignores a very human aspect of real-life ethical deliberation. Empathy, resentment, and 
anger play a useful role in our moral thinking, and an approach that privileges rationality 
above all else excludes trust, narrative or “other representational modes of reasoning, 
rather than acknowledging the stories and images that are powerful tools for making 
moral sense of the world and our place in it” (Lindemann 2006, 80). 
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 Contemporary principlist approaches to biomedical ethics tend to put autonomy 
above all, often at the expense of context in individual cases. Autonomy is potentially 
problematic in that it is difficult to apply evenly to all races, genders, and classes, 
particularly when there is a large power and knowledge differential, as exists in medicine. 
Groenhout (2004) writes that “instead of a matter of impartial, absolute principles... 
ethical experience is fundamentally a matter of care, an affected response to 
vulnerability” (14). Principlist theories guide hypothetical people who are detached from 
others, self-sufficient, and equal in social power, and what is morally valuable about them 
is only their ability to reason. Lindemann (2006) points out that this conception 
misrepresents most women’s lives because like men, we would not be who we are 
without the social relationships that shape us but moreover, power inequities can often 
inhibit higher levels of both self-sufficiency and the ability to reason solely about oneself. 
 
The Gendering of Ethics 
 In her groundbreaking work, In A Different Voice (1982), Gilligan explored how 
men and women approach ethics in a gendered way, and in doing so, “articulated the 
sense of alienation many women have experienced in trying to work within the structures 
of contemporary moral theory” (Sherwin 1989, 58). She found in her research that “men 
seem preoccupied with developing comprehensive, generalizable, abstract ethical systems 
which are based on rights, while women seem to be concerned with understanding the 
specific human dynamics of a situation and, hence, concentrate on particular narrative 
details with the aim of avoiding hurt and providing care” (59). Men too had the “tendency 
to view reality as unequivocal and thus to argue that there is one right or better way of 
seeing” (Gilligan 1982, 683). Ultimately, Gilligan (1982) concluded that standard 
conceptions of ethics are gender-biased, and there are in fact two different patterns of 
moral reasoning: one which pursues universal rules in order to ensure fairness and one 
which is focused on the feelings and relationships of involved parties. In the same vein, 
Walker (1992) claims that “we need ethics because we need both constructive and critical 
ways of thinking about political legitimacy, social values, and individual and collective 
responsibilities;” in other words, a deeply reflexive ethics, able to recognize and 
interrogate its own social and political impact (34).  
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Feminist Bioethics 
 In response to the feminist rejection of the idea of the “ideal ethical reasoner as 
solitary and powerful—read masculine—judge who applies lawlike principles,” feminists 
have instead conceived of a cooperative ethical deliberation (Lindemann 2007, 118). 
While “emotion is not a guarantee of right action[,] neither is it synonymous with 
irrationality and error,” on which non-feminist approaches to ethics are premised (Morris 
2001, 65). Held (1990) writes that reason has been associated with male endeavor, and 
emotion with female weakness. Not all feminists agree on distinctive feminist virtues or 
values. There are some significant commonalities however; primarily, feminist ethical 
frameworks hold that “the history of philosophy, including the history of ethics, has been 
constructed from male points of view, and has been built on assumptions and concepts 
that are by no means gender-neutral. Feminists characteristically begin with different 
concerns and different emphasis to the issues we consider than do non-feminist 
approaches” (682). In non-feminist ethics, there is a split between reason and emotion 
and a devaluation of emotion. Donchin and Purdy (1999) put forth two themes dominant 
in feminist bioethics: “power and particularity—the powers that divide and marginalize 
non-dominant people, and the particularities and personal lives that resist confinement 
within externally imposed categories;” these “particularities and personal lives” are 
embedded in narrative (8). Alcoff and Kittay (2007) summarize feminist approaches to 
ethics as emphasizing relationality and the use of personal narrative, with a key 
breakdown of the border between rationality and emotion. 
 
Care-Focused Feminist Ethics 
 The conception of the feminist ethic of care is attributed to Gilligan’s (1982) 
work. She saw the rule-based, or justice, perspective and the care perspective as two 
different ethical orientations: “two moral perspectives that organize thinking in different 
ways” (683). She claimed that while people might be aware of both perspectives, they 
tend to adopt only one or the other in defining and resolving moral conflict. For Gilligan, 
The distinction between justice and care cuts across the familiar 
divisions between thinking and feeling, egoism and altruism, 
theoretical and practical reasoning. It calls attention to the fact that all 
human relationships, public and private, can be characterized both in 
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terms of equality and in terms of attachment, and that both inequality 
and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern (683).  
 
She offers the two moral injunctions of not acting unfairly toward others and not turning 
away from someone in need to capture and explicate these different concerns.   
           Relationships between people and the obligations that these create are also central 
to the care ethic. In fact, “detachment, whether from self or from others, is morally 
problematic, since it breeds moral blindness or indifference—a failure to discern or 
respond to need” (686). It is the relationship that “becomes the figure for considering, and 
relationships are seen to require listening and efforts at understanding differences in 
belief. Rather than the right to disagree, the speaker focuses on caring to hear and be 
heard. Attention shifts from the grounds for agreement (rights and respect) to the grounds 
for understanding (listening and speaking, hearing and being heard). This is a paradigm-
shift from rule-based ethics. Indeed, “the capacity to form and maintain relationships... is 
arguably just as much of an achievement as autonomy, and just as important for moral 
maturity” (Keller 1997, 154). 
 An overarching assumption of the care ethic is that it “criticizes impartialist moral 
theory as being inappropriate for resolving certain kinds of moral problems... care ethics 
therefore claims that impartiality, following rules, and the use of reason to the exclusion 
of affect are all inappropriate for resolving certain kinds of moral problems” (154). Care 
theorists do not accept traditional moral principles above all else, instead pressing for an 
ethical framework that stresses alternatives values such as love, care, and responsibility. 
They claim that it is these values that can capture the subtleties of context and the bonds 
of relationships principle-oriented frameworks overlook (Donchin 2009). Relationships 
are key for feminist theories of ethics. Alcoff and Kittay (2007) write of an agent that is 
always in-relationship, and Friedman and Bolte (2007) point out that this focus on 
relationships has moved the relationship to “philosophical center stage, where they now 
challenge the theoretical adequacy of longstanding ethical norms of impartiality and 
universality” (83). 
 In summation, the feminist ethic of care is concerned with actual relationships 
between persons, and emotion is appreciated rather than rejected (Held 1990). “Caring, 
empathy, feeling with others, being sensitive to each other’s feelings, all may be better 
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guides to what morality requires in actual contexts than may abstract rules of reason” 
(689). Gilligan (1982), Noddings (1984), and Held (1990) accept that caring is morally 
significant, in fact, the only legitimate moral consideration: “human love, human caring, 
will be quite enough on which to found an ethic” (29). A care ethic emphasizes family 
obligations and validates emotional attachments; it focuses on not hurting others, 
avoiding selfishness and maintaining relationships, context, responsibility, relational and 
dependant nature of persons, the involuntary nature of crucial care relationships, and 
inequalities of power (Friedman and Bolte 2007).  
 
Oppression 
 A defining characteristic of a feminist ethic is the imperative of identifying, 
analyzing, reducing, and eliminating oppression in all its forms (Sherwin 1996). It can be 
central, as it is for Sherwin: a “feminist ethics is characterized by the commitment to the 
feminist agenda of eliminating the subordination of women,” as “the principle insight of 
feminist ethics is that oppression, however it is practiced, is morally wrong” (1992, 54). 
Robb (1981) claims instead that such a focus can be tangential, but regardless of its 
centrality, it is there. A feminist structure of ethics is “capable of challenging the 
structures and systems that perpetuate women’s disempowerment” (Donchin and Purdy 
1999, 9). I have already devoted attention in my introduction and in the introduction to 
this section to qualifying “oppression” and defining it for my purposes; I define it as 
suppressing patient narrative ways of knowing, or discounting the perspectives of people 
on their own bodies.  
 Relationships are central in feminist ethics, but these relationships too can be 
oppressive, and those “studied in ethics must attend to the interdependent, emotionally 
varied, unequal relationships that shape our lives” (Sherwin 1989, 62). The 
empowerment of the oppressed is an ethical issue. There exist many diverse attempts to 
characterize feminist ethics, but all share some analysis of unequal power (Sherwin 
1989). Because feminism itself arises from moral objections to oppression, it must remain 
committed to the pursuit of social justice as a central concern (Sherwin 1992). 
Lindemann (2006) defines the term oppression as a “system of institutional forces and 
processes that keep the members of some social groups from full participation in their 
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societies” (31). In the context of the medical encounter, oppression can refer to disparate 
levels of knowledge between patient and physician, with little attempt to disseminate 
information. It can refer to biases toward certain values in medicine that can be 
incorrectly assumed to be universal. It can exist in the absence of attempts to empathize 
and accommodate patients of differing backgrounds, and it can be present when patients’ 
choices for medical treatment are restricted by the agendas of medical providers. 
 
Medical Ethics and Feminist Ethics 
 While Wolf (1996) points out that there might not be a single correct or definitive 
view of the relationship between feminism and bioethics, there are some distinct 
similarities and differences between the two. As above, she asserts that feminist bioethics 
is not necessarily a separate bioethics for women, but like other feminist ethics, it must be 
a bioethics that sees oppression and power and gender as central. It turns out that a care-
focused feminist ethic is “readily adaptable to bioethics, where the importance of 
considering the particular needs of patients and attending to health professionals’ special 
relationship toward them is already well entrenched in moral deliberations” (Sherwin 
1989, 50). In both medical ethics and feminist ethics, there is a sense of frustration with 
the abstraction and generality that characterizes traditional and theoretical work in 
philosophy and in ethics, and both share a commitment to evaluating context and 
allowing for personal aspects of relationships in ethical analysis. Context and narrative 
are appealed to in both feminist and medical ethics. Indeed, both feminist ethics and 
medical ethics reflect an interest surrounding particular relationships, in light of the fact 
that rights and responsibilities are not necessarily universal, instead depending on 
existing roles and relationships among those who differ with regard to power and status. 
 
Similarities Between Medical Ethics and Feminist Ethics 
 There are several parallels between non-feminist medical ethics and feminist 
ethics. Both approaches have made context a valid focus, both understand that influential 
relationships might not be perfectly equal, and “some authors in medical ethics express a 
desire reminiscent of feminism to include caring values in their analysis” (Sherwin 1989, 
62). Sherwin (1992) points out that, like feminist ethics, the literature of medical ethics 
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seeks a pragmatic and context-specific approach to ethics. Both fields recognize the 
limitations of abstractions with regard to moral reasoning for resolving real-life moral 
dilemmas.  
 
Care/Beneficence 
 Non-feminist medical ethics also acknowledges the role of relationships. Both 
non-feminist medical ethics and the feminist approach are critical of the traditional 
assumption that the role of ethics is to clarify obligations between actors who are “equal, 
independent, rational, and autonomous” (Sherwin 1992, 82). It is in the biomedical 
ethical principle of beneficence where a certain acknowledgment of feminist-like care is 
embedded. Pellegrino (1988) is a principlist theorist who places emphasis on beneficence 
(or care) above respect for persons as the paramount principle to be considered. Sherwin 
(1989) corroborates the fact that “there is frequent mention of the need to engage 
considerations of caring in medical ethics, usually couched in the language of the 
[obligation of] beneficence that is owed to patients” (60). 
 
Centrality of Narrative 
 If, like feminist approaches, non-feminist medical ethics has also acknowledged 
that abstract moral theory as a guide for reasoning is limited for resolving real life moral 
dilemmas, then what is advocated instead? Patient narrative and context, a narrative 
approach to moral dilemmas, is encouraged by both frameworks as a better way to make 
sure that moral deliberation is relevant enough to the real-life relationships and lives that 
any resulting ethical conclusion will affect. If with narrative, “medical dilemmas are 
often discussed in terms that appear to rank sensitivity and caring ahead of applications of 
principle,” than narrative as a tool, rather than rule-like principles, is a better fit for 
feminist approaches—because it is able to better address the role of context (Sherwin 
1989, 60). The trend in non-feminist medical ethics is to examine issues in context and 
avoid dependence on generalities and abstractions. Theorists in medical ethics likewise 
find that simple appeals to theory and principle do not offer satisfying analyses and 
conclusions for the sorts of dilemmas that arise in actual real-life bioethical deliberation. 
Warren (1989) adds that in medical ethics, more listening is required.  
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 In contrast with applying a general rule or principle, the feminist approach to 
ethics uses context and narrative to find resolution in textual details (Sherwin 1989). 
Because feminist ethicists “must call the standing theories into question, a narrative 
approach to moral deliberation is particularly well-suited to a feminist bioethical analysis 
of a case” (Lindemann 2007, 124). Both feminist ethics and medical ethics beg narrative, 
and for feminists, ethical conclusions depend on context. Nothing intrinsically good, or 
beneficent, or wrong, or evil, and it is here that we can avoid passing judgment without 
holding all of the facts. The “focus on context in feminist and medical ethics helps make 
evident that the nature of specific relationships is an important element of ethical 
analysis,” including social context that might be oppressive (61). The “value of narrative 
bioethics may lie precisely in its power to illuminate the submerged struggles,” which is 
certainly in line with feminist goals. While it might not be possible to get to the very 
bottom of the event, it will still help to unfold the implications of experience (Morris 
2001, 63). This is what feminist ethics mandates. For those for whom autonomy is 
difficult or irrelevant—the very ill or the oppressed—a narrative approach to moral 
deliberation only makes sense for a feminist bioethical analysis, and vice versa (Nelson 
1997). 
 While non-feminist bioethicists work with cases and contexts, Lindemann (2007) 
asserts that they do not usually approach them in the narrative way that she advocates. 
For her, case commentators still act as judges, invoking principles or laws that serve as 
guides to right conduct; once these principles have been derived from the cases, context 
is of no further interest. In contrast, true narrative approaches require closer attention to 
context because of what is revealed about the identities of the players beyond just the 
moment of ethical conflict. Lindemann (2007) also writes that true narrative approaches 
reveal a “temporal” context, which goes beyond the social. A narrative approach is 
expressive of who we are and who we hope to be, collaborative in that it posits not as a 
solitary judge but as a community of those who need to construct ways of living well 
together, and feminist because it is a means of resisting powerful ideologies. 
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Justice 
 Donchin (2009) finds that justice and care are closely intertwined on a practical 
level. Both non-feminist medical ethics and feminist medical ethics use justice as a 
principle central to ethical conclusions. However, if for medical ethics, justice is 
understood as the fairest distribution of benefits and burdens5, for feminists, justice 
becomes understood as freedom from oppression and as respect for individuals in the 
contexts of their own lives. 
 
Differences Between Medical Ethics and Feminist Ethics 
            While there are parallels between non-feminist medical ethics and feminist 
approaches to ethics with regard to care, narrative, and justice, there are enough key 
differences between them to deem medical ethics less than feminist. According to a 
feminist critique, traditional ethics implies that, in general, women are not as morally 
mature as men. In a medical encounter, the same assumption is often made about the 
patient. Culturally feminine traits like connection, sharing, and emotion are discounted, 
while “male” ways of reasoning emphasizing rules, rights, and impartiality are 
preferenced (Jaggar 2001). A “sexist ethics would never appear sexist; it would be 
clothed in a cloak of neutrality;” it would “allow women and men to compete equally for 
the positions of nurse and physician, without questioning the roles themselves, which 
were founded on an unequal power relationship between females and males” (Warren 
1989, 74-75). In this way, the political dimension essential to a feminist ethic is lacking. 
If ethical decisions must weigh all of the relevant data, and if medical ethics is not 
considering the feminist goal of identifying and working to eliminate oppression in all its 
forms, then not considering fully the oppressive power differentials inherent in medical 
practice is not considering all of the relevant data (Robb 1981). Held (1990) adds that 
feminists reject a case-by-case approach as is found in non-feminist medical ethics; while 
both reject abstract rules as a guideline, for feminists, the consideration of cases in 
isolation ignores patterns and trends in the practice of medicine that can lead to further 
oppression. Political issues are always embedded in ethical cases.                                                          
5 See Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th Edition, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pg. 226. 
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 For non-feminist medical ethics, the primary “relationship question in medical 
ethics now involves competitions for power, status, or authority [and] relationships are 
assumed to be fine when there is no overt struggle for power” (Warren 1989, 80). This is 
decidedly non-feminist. Indeed, principle-based medical ethics “excludes some 
dimensions of moral experience, such as contextual decision making, special obligations, 
the moral motive of compassion and sympathy, and the relevance of considering one’s 
own integrity in making moral decisions” (Calhoun 1988, 688). For Calhoun (1988), 
principle-based approaches to medical ethics are not considered gender-neutral because 
the advocated ideals of agency and rational moral reasoning are easier for men than for 
women to achieve. Some critics add that even if non-feminist approaches to medical 
ethics do not in principle exclude the ethics of care, if such concerns are not central or 
directly addressed, it is both inadequate and gender-biased (Gilligan 1982), (Calhoun 
1988), (Warren 1989), (Held, 1990).  
 
Treatment of Oppression 
 If the general feminist objection is eliminating oppression in all its forms, then 
this is not addressed in the same way in medical ethics (Sherwin 1989), (Lindemann 
2006). There exist similarities between the two theoretical orientations with respect to 
caring and beneficence, context and narrative, and relationships. However, because 
medical ethics does not “display any commitment to ending oppression,” much of 
contemporary biomedical ethics “must be judged as lacking from the perspective of 
feminist ethics” (Sherwin 1992, 84). The concept of autonomy that is central for much of 
contemporary bioethical debate, rather than “working to empower the oppressed and 
exploited among us, in practice often serves to protect the privileges of the most 
powerful” (Sherwin 1996, 53). Because of this, medical ethics is decidedly non-feminist.  
 Fundamentally, medicine thrives on hierarchical power structures, and it actually 
tends to strengthen patterns of stereotyping and reinforce existing power inequalities, 
which is an unintended backlash to the attempt to hold respect for autonomy front and 
center (Sherwin 1989). Again, without explicitly weighing this in its moral deliberation, 
medical ethics is decidedly non-feminist. A “feminist ethics of health care includes 
reflection on the underlying medical views of the body,” and the body, particularly the 
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feminine and reproductive aspects of the body are medicalized and in this way are 
medically dominated (Sherwin 1992, 92). The subservient role of patient is feminine: 
“patients are required to submit to medical authority and respond with gratitude... 
because feminism is occupied with redefining feminine roles, a feminist ethics of health 
care takes a natural interest in redefining the feminine aspects of the role of patient,” and 
no evidence of this consideration is seen in medical ethics (92). 
 Knowledge is power. It is the physicians who possess the training and the 
“technical expertise that is essential to sound medical decision-making, but they lack 
other kinds of knowledge necessary to make good decisions about particular patients’ 
needs... their medical training does not provide them with special knowledge about the 
social context in which patients’ needs for health care arise” (154). For medical ethics to 
be considered feminist, a greater emphasis must be placed on communication and sharing 
of knowledge. If a physician dismisses what a patient knows from his own experience 
solely because he occupies a lower position in the cognitive hierarchy, then that is 
morally wrong, and oppressive (Lindemann 2006).  
 While feminist ethical frameworks are set up in a way to critique the potentially 
oppressive structures of medicine, for medical ethics, the “institution of medicine is 
usually accepted as given in discussions of medical ethics, and debate has focused on 
certain practices within that structure... the effect is to provide an ethical legitimization of 
the institution overall, with acceptance of its general structure and patterns” (63). This 
can have the effect on the lower levels of the hierarchy, who might be oppressed by the 
structure of medicine, to place even greater trust in the judgment of those above. Feminist 
theorists must be critical of the fact that medical ethics has remained “largely silent about 
the patriarchal practice of medicine;” consequently, medical ethics, as it is generally 
“practiced to date, does not amount to a feminist approach to ethics” (64). Persons do not 
exist in abstraction apart from their social circumstances, and these social circumstances 
should not be ignored in reaching ethical conclusions to dilemmas. Ultimately, “moral 
analysis should examine persons and their behavior in the context of political relations 
and experiences, but this dimension has so far been missing from most of the debates in 
medical ethics” (Sherwin 1992, 53). Donchin (2009) adds that the oppressive social 
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environments that might not be prioritized from a principlist view of medical ethics can 
easily impair the autonomy that many principlist theorists place front and center.  
 
Power and Oppression 
 Closely related to the underlying oppression that feminists work to uncover and 
eliminate (and non-feminist bioethics does not) is the power differential in the medical 
encounter, which in and of itself can be oppressive. There are significant power nuances 
at play between physicians and patients in the medical encounter, specifically when there 
is a gender, class, race, or educational disparity, and the feminist framework addresses 
these disparities where medical ethics can fail to give them the proportional weight that 
they deserve in bioethical deliberation. In contrast, for feminists, an important aspect of 
ethical analysis is to come to a clear understanding of the power structures present and 
active in medicine (Sherwin 1989). Sherwin (1989) notes that feminist discussions of 
healthcare warn of the misappropriated use of medical power that can disempower the 
patient; she then goes on to write in 1992 that a central task of a feminist ethical 
framework for health care is to “develop contextual models of restructuring the power 
associated with healing” (93). 
 The critical point is that,   
Theorists in the justice tradition [principle-based models of 
medical ethics] have not said much, except in passing, about the 
ethics of care, and are unlikely to say much in the future without a 
radical shift in theoretical priorities; and concentrating almost 
exclusively on rights on noninterference, impartiality, rationality, 
autonomy, and principles creates an ideology of the moral domain 
that has undesirable political implications for women (Calhoun 
1988, 689).  
 
Feminists must explore the contexts within the oft-overlooked system of oppressive 
practices. Ultimately, without knowledge and understanding of how the interests of 
relevant parties in an ethical debate may be impacted by power inequity, an analysis is 
incomplete (Calhoun 1988), (Sherwin 1992). 
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Centrality of Principles 
 Another decidedly non-feminist aspect of medical ethics is its overall focus on 
principles, in accordance with the supposed objectivity of principled thinking (Bowden 
1997). Lindemann (2006) likewise criticizes the “impartial, impersonal, universalistic, 
narrowly rational moral theories that have dominated ethics” (17). Principles often favor 
a generic, individual subject who is male and privileged, and this theoretical orientation 
justifies the status quo, inhibiting social change (Donchin 2009). Harms that are 
experienced by oppressed groups get mischaracterized in bioethical debate as harms 
experienced by generic individuals, which can misdirect focus and inhibit progress. For 
Wolf (1996), abstract rules or principles erase gender; for Warren (1989), because theory 
should be constructed from life experience, and life precedes theory, an overreliance on 
theory in practical ethical deliberation is flawed. For Sherwin (1992), justice cannot be 
defined in the abstract. Keller (1997) writes that there is problematic tension between 
care and autonomy, and for Walker (1992) the emphasis of abstract problem-solving over 
responses to actual others is problematic. Sherwin (1989) writes that a single theory or 
strategy should not be considered adequate for settling all ethical questions. Bowden 
(1997) writes that caring is ethically significant, and it cannot be easily reduced to a 
single guiding principle. Ultimately, “convincing arguments against principlism do not 
reject principles but instead reject the claim that principles hold absolutist status as 
expressions of universal reason” (Morris 2001, 58). Medicine needs to take seriously the 
understanding that ethics involves more than just principles, and theorists who have 
written on the use of narrative in clinical ethics can suggest just that (Morris 2001), 
(Brody 2003), (Kleinman 1988), (Hunter 2001), (Charon and Montello 2002). Despite 
objections, many feminists do not wish to dispose of all principles to guide action. Some 
think a framework that incorporates universal principles can constitute one dimension of 
an adequate bioethical theory, as long as principles are formulated in non-exclusionary 
terms that reflect the interconnected context of real lives (Donchin 2009). 
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Relational Autonomy 
 In bioethics, autonomy is often equated with informed consent,6 but feminist 
theory indicates that there can be more than one legitimate conception of autonomy7. 
Providing more information in the interest of informed consent does not necessarily equal 
greater respect for autonomy; extensive information and alternatives might actually 
impede decision-making (Dodds 2000).The principlist conception of autonomy is now 
regarded by many feminist ethicists with suspicion; some writers have identified the 
concept of autonomy as inherently promoting masculine ideals of reason and self-reliance 
(Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 3). The human values, social practices, relationships, and 
communities that are based on cooperation and interdependence can even be seen to 
threaten or compromise this conception of autonomy (6). Respect for autonomy is cashed 
out in respect for “rational” medical choices, and this notion of rationality and autonomy 
is a “historically, socially, and culturally specific ideal that parades as a universal norm” 
(11). Principlist conceptions assume that individuals are equally rational and equally able 
to reflect once given adequate information (Dodds 2000). Therefore, the rational 
competence of certain groups is often questioned because they might lack emotional 
distance and the objectivity to act rationally, and therefore even possess autonomy at all. 
Recognizing the complex connections among individuals with regard to society and 
culture, some feminists theorists are now promoting instead a relational model of 
autonomy that stresses the human web of interconnected relationships, the social norms 
and pressures that influence medical choices offered to patients, and the obligation of 
health care providers to promote patient autonomy (Donchin 2009). 
 Donchin (2009) notes that oppressive social environments, illness, or trauma can 
easily impair autonomy. An ill patient does not much resemble the autonomous ideal: 
independent, unconnected, self-interested and self-reliant, unconnected to others, 
interchangeable and impartial, dispassionate, detached, and in a position to advocate for 
themselves. Conditions within which medical decisions are made are far from the rational 
ideal of autonomy, and such decisions are not made as isolated and rational atoms (Dodds 
2000, 222). When human webs of relationships surrounding patients are examined,                                                         
6 Dodds 2000, Lindemann 2006. 
7 Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000. 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intimates most closely involved in their care are revealed, along with a more nuanced 
account of how best to respond morally (Lindemann 2006). Without this consideration, 
the diversity and complexity of individuals is pared away and agents are reduced to 
interchangeable sameness (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 6). 
 Because individuals differ so significantly in their talents, capacities, character 
traits, values, desires, beliefs, and emotional attitudes, one single blueprint for what 
constitutes an autonomous life is not possible (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). If we think 
of autonomy as characteristic of agents who are “emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, 
and feeling,” as well as rational, we might see that autonomy can only be developed in 
the social context (21). Friedman and Bolte (2007) define the feminist relational version 
of autonomy as one that “focuses on the social context in which autonomy emerges and 
on the social nature of the self who realizes autonomy... thus treat[ing] social 
relationships as necessary for the achievement of autonomy” (89). An understanding of 
autonomy as connected to informed consent is a physician-focused autonomy, 
presupposing that ethical concern should be directed to the actions of the physician in 
providing information and obtaining consent and not to the decision-making process of 
the patient (Dodds 2000). Relational autonomy brings the focus back to the patient, and 
his or her social networks and understandings that influence his or her own unique 
autonomy.  
 In addition, “there are good grounds for critically examining the ways in which 
the dominant conception of autonomy used in bioethics may contribute to the systems of 
oppression” (Dodds 2000, 223). A relational understanding of autonomy can address 
forces of oppression where non-feminist bioethics falls short. Relational approaches are 
concerned with analyzing the role that “social norms and institutions [medicine], cultural 
practices, and social relationships play in shaping the beliefs, desires, and attitudes of 
agents in oppressive social contexts;” in fact, oppressive social environments can impair 
agents’ autonomy in this way and at this level (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000, 22). Donchin 
(2009) writes that feminist approaches capture contextual subtleties and relational bonds 
overlooked in principle-based frameworks; I propose that relational autonomy does the 
same for bioethical autonomy. It is a more robust conception of autonomy that pays due 
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attention to context. Autonomy defined solely as  informed consent allows patients to 
choose “freely” from restricted options.  
 
Relational Autonomy and Trust 
 O’Neill (2002) asserts that the promotion of traditional individualist autonomy is 
detrimental to trust within the medical encounter. Autonomy identified only as individual 
independence can lead to “ethically dubious or disastrous action... trust is surely more 
important, and particularly so for any ethically adequate practice of medicine” (xi). For 
O’Neill, promoting only the traditional, individualist, and principlist conception of 
autonomy is inadequate. Holding individualism and solitary decision-making above all in 
medical contexts undermines trust in medicine as a whole. She posits that some 
conceptions of autonomy and trust are compatible. The conception of autonomy that I 
seek to promote—one that is feminist and relational—goes beyond compatibility. It 
actually promotes trust. It undoubtedly took a great deal of trust for my patient-subjects 
to share personal, painful, and intimate details of their lives with me, a perfect stranger, 
during the stressful and frightening experience of illness. The bond that was created, if 
only for an hour or less, was crucial to the project and to my goals. My research process 
contributed to the empowerment of my patients by elevating them to a new level of 
relational autonomy through the cooperation that occurred during our interactions. The 
trust that was necessary in our encounters supports both the trust that O’Neill (2002) 
finds essential to the effective and ethical medical encounter, as well as the specific 
conception of autonomy that I seek to promote.  
 
Relational Autonomy and Patient Listening 
 A relational conception of autonomy differs from the standard conception of 
autonomy as informed consent. The standard conception demands reason, dependent on 
self-reliance, independence, and freedom from interference. In contrast, relational 
autonomy is premised on the interdependence we have with those close to us—our 
families and social groups—and others—our medical caregivers—and how they affect 
and influence our every decision. Through the trust that I cultivated with patient-subjects 
during my Patient Listening project, I became part of their social networks (like those in 
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which we are all embedded) if only for an hour. While autonomy as informed consent 
depends on a strict definition of reason or “rational” medical decision-making, my 
research introduces a new, broader concept of reason or rationality, in which reason-in-
autonomy does not exclude others, but rather includes the influence and input of others 
within the social webs that we as humans cannot escape or deny. A relational conception 
of autonomy is a better moral option for patients in pursuing medical treatment and 
making medical decisions. This morality can be based in a different and more pragmatic 
kind of reason that necessarily takes cooperation with others and interdependence into 
account. Relational autonomy is still a relatively undefined term for feminist theorists, 
and my research sheds new light, contributing to its analysis and its depth. 
 
Conception of Justice 
 If justice for non-feminist bioethicists is found in the equal distribution of 
resources and benefits and burdens, then a feminist understanding can enrich justice itself 
with the idea of justice as the freedom from oppression. Groenhout (2004) explains that,  
 human lives are never self-defining and self-sustaining in the ways 
that would be needed for neutrality to make sense. Humans have 
limited abilities to care for themselves, and they are dependent on 
the others around them to support and provide for them. Given this 
finitude and dependency, abstract justice, with its fiction of 
absolute independence, cannot offer a version of how we should 
arrange our lives together to provide for the support we all need 
(85). 
 
The feminist ethics of care assumes that humans are relational beings whose families and 
situations and socialization create context. Care ethics adds to abstract conceptions of 
justice, insisting that the “finite, dependent, situated, and relational nature of humans” 
figure into our calculus and understanding of justice (178). In order to adequately 
evaluate concerns of justice, we must “analyze and construct social institutions that take 
into account the needs and interdependencies that are a part of human life [and] recognize 
that humans come in a broad range of ages, social situations, and dependency conditions” 
(178). Inattention to social context in ethics cases also serves to maintain unjust social 
hierarchies (123). 
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 Feminist bioethics, however, does not dictate a complete overhaul of justice; 
ethics of care does not reject the basic aspects of principlist accounts of justice, such as 
rights. Rights are an important concept for any conception of justice, but they are not 
sufficient as an account of what justice requires (180). Lindemann (2007) asserts that 
bioethicists have not yet fully availed themselves of feminist resources for critique of 
medical practice; medicine ought to be of particular concern to feminists, as it commands 
great prestige, authority and power, and therefore potential for abuse. Justice, in the 
context of my research, is couched in making voices heard: patient voices, particularly 
embedded in social context. 
 
Patient Listening and Feminist Ethics 
 Clinical medical ethics and feminist ethics share some commonalities, particularly 
with regard to case context and legitimacy of narrative, however, feminist ethics has still 
more to contribute to medical ethics with regard to conceptions of power, autonomy, and 
justice. A feminist-inspired model of relational autonomy takes into account that humans 
do not exist in vacuums, but instead in “enmeshed relationships of interdependence” 
(Groenhout 2004, 10). We exist in complex webs of relationships and responsibilities that 
shape who we are and what we do, and not as solitary, individualistic, and solely rational 
agents. Autonomy as informed consent pays no attention to context, “ignoring 
background conditions that patients bring to their medical experience” and “institutional 
power relationships that influence their opinion” (Donchin 2009). My poetic study results 
are full of context and evidence of the relationships from which patients are inseparable, 
and which influence their every thought and decision. These enmeshed agents are 
evidence in favor of a feminist relational autonomy.  
 A feminist-inspired bioethics more effectively addresses systemic injustices in the 
medical establishment impacting our ability to consider other ways of knowing beyond 
the empirical. Closer attention to power relationships can lead to new understandings of 
autonomy. A feminist approach would pay more attention to justice and equality toward 
women and other marginalized identities. A full commitment to justice requires more 
than attention to allocation of resources and universal benefits and burdens. A system that 
legitimizes only one way of knowing—empirical and scientific—and that discounts 
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entirely a different way of knowing embodied in patients themselves and their 
relationships is lacking. Identifying problematic structural failures is the first step toward 
the feminist goal of promoting justice and mitigating its opposite.  
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7.0 NARRATIVE ETHICS AND NARRATIVE TRUTH 
 
 A system of ethics conceived of using narrative is called “narrative ethics,” and 
this project fits within this system. As has been discussed at length above, many forces 
restrict physicians’ abilities to reflect on their clinical experiences and relationships, and 
this medical practice without reflection is unable to grow and become more humane. 
Both Charon (1991, 2002) and Hunter (1991) have observed that both the practice of 
medicine and the structure of medical knowledge are themselves narrative-based; the 
narrative medicine movement seeks to bring practitioners back, closer to the stories of 
illness, to more effectively treat patients and bring about healing. 
 
Narrative Competence and Narrative Responsibility 
 Narrative competence is, as defined also by Charon, the “set of skills required to 
recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by the stories one hears or reads” (2004, 862). 
The practice of narrative medicine in all of its forms can increase narrative competence, 
and development of narrative competence allows for a more ethical treatment of the 
narratives of patients. Consider also cultural competence, defined as a set of skills 
utilized to interact effectively with people of different cultures; it is similar to the concept 
of narrative competence, which requires those in possession of it to listen to, and analyze, 
stories. In order to be culturally competent, one must possess an awareness of one's own 
cultural worldview and attitude towards cultural differences. It is important to note that 
allopathic medicine has a very distinct culture of its own. One who is versed in cultural 
and narrative competence must possess a knowledge of and interest in different cultural 
practices and ideas, and a measure of curiosity, flexibility, and empathy. “When a doctor 
practices medicine with narrative competence, he or she can quickly hear and interpret 
what a patient tries to say;” working toward this kind of competence results in an ability 
to understand, communicate with, and effectively interact with people across cultures and 
ideologies regarding their individual and cultural experiences of illness, ideally toward a 
more ethical end (862). The concept of narrative responsibility refers to a set of important 
ethical implications. As each person plays a part in the life stories, or the narratives, of 
others, one must be mindful of one’s impacts. Each person bears responsibility for the  
 107 
roles they play in the narratives of others; it helps in understanding to frame these 
interactions as the “joint construction of mutual narratives” (Pullman et al.. 2005, 281).  
 Narrative competence and narrative ethics are definitively linked. A poignant 
example is the narrative of Lia Lee. Fadiman’s The Spirit Catches You and You Fall 
Down (1997), is both a rich narrative and a warning. Lia Lee, a young Hmong girl living 
in Merced, California, is in a persistent vegetative state as the result of severe epilepsy, 
and the narrative brings up issues of narrative competence, and the lack thereof, in 
contemporary medical care. There was a fundamental crisis between Lia’s physicians and 
her culturally Hmong family and community; they spoke two different languages, 
literally and figuratively, and it was this lack of communication on any practical level 
that was the beginning of the end for Lia. The doctors’ understanding of Lia’s illness was 
vastly different from that of her parents and no effective attempt was made to bridge the 
divide. In the Lees’ minds, it was the very anticonvulsant medication given to tame her 
disease that was causing her problems: “Lia got very sick and I think it is because they 
gave her too much medicine” (148). Conventional attempts to bridge the cultural divide 
failed. Even the “counseling sessions, which usually left them confused and angry, were 
intended to reduce their stress” (150). The Lees were found to be “non-compliant” in 
administering the anti-convulsant medication to the child, with disastrous results: she was 
removed from the care of her parents for a time, a traumatic, and perhaps unnecessary, 
situation for both parties. The conflict between Lia and her doctors went beyond ideas of 
compliance and non-compliance. The Lees simply lacked the frame of reference to 
understand Lia’s condition in the Western context. As refugees, “violence, starvation, 
destitution, exile and death, were, however horrific, within the sphere of known tragedies. 
What happened to Lia was outside that [imaginable] sphere” (171). There was no 
meaningful attempt at communication, no meaningful consideration of narrative, or social 
factors, or oppression, or power. A lot of questionable ethical conclusions led to a 
catastrophic conclusion. 
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Narrative Ethics  
 Medicine practiced with an understanding of narrative ethics ideally leads to 
narrative competence, which according to Brody (2003) cultivates “philosophical 
understanding of what it means to be sick, for ethical guidance, and for improving the 
quality of health care and the education of health professionals,” and this goes beyond 
giving the patient a voice and sense of power (2). As the use of stories in medical theory 
and practice is considered narrative medicine, medical ethics conceived of and practiced 
using stories is called narrative ethics. Narrative offers tools that take into account the 
subtleties of perspective and the human aspects of ethical dilemmas not addressed by 
strict principlist-based medical ethics alone. Much has been written about using stories of 
illness as tools for ethics, but in this context, suffice it to say that there is an intuitive 
component, in that “narrative elements are deeply embedded in moral reasoning,” and 
there is legitimacy here in that “responses to narratives are the grounds out of which our 
principles and theories grow” (179). The “characterization of narrative ethics as opposed 
to ‘theory’ is not so straight forward, however, since narrative ethics is a theory” (Rees 
2008, 163). Difficult ethical decisions can often benefit from a narrative approach in the 
pursuit of resolution. When there are no clear answers, such as laws or principles 
dictating moral responsibility, sometimes another way of knowing is needed—an 
epistemology different from the empirically-based medical paradigm. “Narrative in a 
general sense thus describes any turn to writing about experiences of medical care as a 
means to accomplish ends that concern more than the ends of medicine itself,” and an end 
more than medicine itself is ethical (165). Ethical dilemmas often end in a mix of failure 
and success, which is difficult to accept for the traditional black-and-white medical 
paradigm. A narrative approach can ultimately promote the ability of the patient to 
continue with her life story, honoring her individual narrative. In fact, in general, 
“medical ethics continually draws on narratives of incurable disease, bodily disfiguration, 
denial of desperately needed services, premature or wrongful death, systematic injustice, 
and tragic loss. Without these narratives of embodied human suffering, medical ethics 
couldn’t happen” (166). The narrative component is already there.  
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 Like feminist conceptions of ethics and unlike rule-based ethics, narrative ethics 
allows for emotions in its calculations. Morris (2001) directs us to consider that the 
emotion inseparable from narrative is valuable in that it can be a resource in the 
formation of moral knowledge and, therefore, ethical action. Narratives work on us by 
engaging emotion, and that emotion is vital to the creation of ethical knowledge (Morris 
2001, Nussbaum 1986). Morris (2001) writes that the fact that habit requires us to put 
reason and emotion into separate words and unconnected categories is a mistake that has 
implications for ethics, because thinking, and in this case, ethical reasoning, involves a 
crucial collaboration with feeling. In fact, an ideal “narrative bioethics would look 
beyond a calculus of principle and reason... to account for the emotion so crucial of 
ethical action” (68). Reason and emotion share roles in the creation of moral knowledge 
and ethical action. In fact, “unacknowledged narratives inseparable from our personal 
identities may matter as much as principles in our everyday moral acts” (71). 
 The point of departure for narrative ethics is the idea that ethics does not exist as a 
set of disembodied principles but rather is embodied in the stories people tell about the 
lives they actually live. The “best way to read the data of bioethics is through the tools of 
what they are: that is, narrative;” bioethics cases are narratives, so to only apply ethical 
theory without narrative theory is a mistake (Chambers 1999, 19). Humans are 
imaginative moral animals, and it is narrative that makes it possible to explore and reflect 
on consequences of decisions and commitments (Johnson 1993). Medicine and narrative 
are one and the same: medicine is filled with life and death human drama (Hunter 1991, 
Morris 2001). A narrative bioethics directs us to consider the “novelistic clash of voices, 
dialects, and values” present in any given medical encounter, and would not consider a 
case decided as soon as one character deems another unethical, reminding us to examine 
what has been unsaid8 (Morris 2001, 63). Narrative ethics brings moral theory down to 
earth and addresses both of the feminist requirements of acknowledging and working 
toward eliminating oppression and helping us to see the nonmedical social narrative 
affecting ethical decisions (Morris 2001). 
                                                          
8 See Fadiman’s The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down. 
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Much of narrative ethics is theoretical and analytical, but there is a creative branch where 
this project will fit: there exists the need for an ethics “attentive to everyday encounters 
and responsive to values submerged in the personal experience of illness” (70). Charon 
and Montello (2002) suggest that narrative approaches to ethics recognize that the 
“singular case emerges only in the act of narrating it and that duties are incurred in the act 
of hearing it” (ix). 
 
Narrative Truth 
 In Western medical culture, the analytic and empirical are celebrated, with 
intuition of patients deemed invalid. Evidence-based medicine reflects the historical bias 
toward the analytic and explicit, while discounting the actual art and science of the 
practice of medicine: pattern recognition in diagnosis, non-verbal cues, and the doctor-
patient relationship. In medicine, science—machines, tests, imaging studies—are the sole 
bearers of truth. Hawkins (1999) addresses the construction of narrative truth as “the task 
of an author of pathography...not only to describe this disordering process but also to 
restore to reality its lost coherence and to discover, or create, a meaning that can bind it 
together again” (3). Here, power is reclaimed from the illness and the medical culture that 
has taken it, and voice and agency are restored to the person possessing the disease in the 
body in the bed. Hawkins finds validity in differing representations of truth: in the 
parallel and opposite dramas of illness narrative and medical case study. In directly 
discussing the idea of narrative truth, she determines that “true stories” are chronicles and 
interpretations of life (1990, 14). Frank (1995) defines narrative truth as the 
“reconnection between past and present... out of narrative truths a sense of coherence can 
be restored” (61). He suggests a new “sick role,” differing from Parsons’ (1951) 
definition: turning illness into a good story, to discover the narrative truth in it and to tell 
that truth, with the ill person as witness. Jerome Bruner’s definition of narrative truth is 
“altering the past in light of the present” (Frank 1995, 65). The discrepancy between 
historical and narrative truth is in continuity and closure, which historical truth does not 
always possess. Narrative truth is where historical fact borders on art, medicalized 
language and wonder are reclaimed, and parts of self are reconciled.  
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 The medical encounter can be seen as an intersection of colliding narratives—that 
of the doctor, the patient, families and culture (again, see Fadiman’s Spirit Catches You 
and You Fall Down). To reach narrative truth is to end denial. Frank writes that narrative 
truth gets us closer to an “ethics of the body,” a body for other bodies, “not just in love 
with yourself but in love with the humanity that shares sickness as its most fundamental 
commonality” (64). If the mind of the storyteller changes, even as the story is being 
spoken, if truth is desired, truth at exactly which moment? He continues: “if truth is so 
hard to grab a hold of, it may instead be the case that when we narrate, a good deal of the 
time we also lie” (Brody 2003). It might be more authentic instead to claim that it is 
actually the listeners who lie by seeking narrative coherence. Brody (2003) argues that 
storytelling is performance and, as such, the teller is playing a role. Unless he or she is 
intentionally and deceptively calculating in creating a persona, the telling of the story 
preserves narrative truth. In other words, “there is not fiction or nonfiction, there is only 
narrative” (Doctorow as quoted in Morris 2001, 57). 
 One of my goals for my project, beyond promoting a relational concept of 
autonomy, is to validate my patients’ ways of knowing. Medical science accepts but one 
definition of truth—that which may be verified empirically via chemical testing or 
mechanical verification. There is truth in the poems—truth in the patients’ experience of 
illness and of their own bodies, and truth in their authentic relationships with their 
families, friends, and caregivers. By revealing this truth in narrative—this narrative 
truth—I seek to illuminate that there is truth other than medical test results, and this truth 
can be helpful in improving the medical encounter and working toward the goal of 
healing. If healing is achieved, then the illness ceases to be oppressive, and this fulfills 
the feminist goal as well.  
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The poetry that I “found” in my subjects’ narratives legitimizes stories and lived 
experiences of the patient participants, picking up where principlism leaves off and 
contributing to a new understanding and application of feminist bioethics. Instead of 
delegitimizing context and individual narratives, feminist ethical approaches seek to 
legitimize the experiences of all, not just those who are clearly able to possess or 
advocate for their own autonomy. Like medical ethics, feminist approaches to ethics see 
value in life stories. They allow patients and caregivers to connect in new ways, raising 
the standard of care and promoting possibly more beneficial treatment plans. Unlike 
medical ethics, feminist approaches examine the contexts and causes contributing to 
oppression and seek to eliminate it in all its forms. The structure of medicine (and 
medical education which perpetuates it generation after generation) is inherently 
hierarchical, and the power in the form of knowledge rests in the hands of the few. 
Medical ethics takes this for granted, not giving it much thought and rarely challenging it. 
In contrast, feminist ethics goes beyond principlism, demonstrating that the ethics are 
also in the details. Caring, doubtlessly, is present in medical interactions. While medical 
ethics tried to awkwardly and imperfectly fit it into the principle of beneficence, feminist 
ethical frameworks acknowledge and legitimize these aspects rather than trying to shut 
them out. 
 In her analysis of the genre of pathography, Hawkins (1999) identifies repeating 
themes, or myths, that appear over and over again in illness narrative. These myths 
become both formative illusion and profound truth (18). One pervasive myth, the battle 
myth, is especially pervasive, especially with regard to cancer; the idea is that the patient 
must fiercely fight his cancer (though it takes place in his own body) and defeat it in 
order to survive. In order to have a battle, there must be an enemy other, medical tools 
can be weapons, and physicians, allies (69). In war also, there is blame and failure and 
fault to be hotly avoided; medical culture has a difficult time with failure. Indeed, “our 
present metaphor in medicine is war and aggression; we fight disease relentlessly, often 
no matter the cost, and sometimes without considering very carefully how much suffering 
or collateral damage the battle will entail” (Coulehan, 2006b, ix). Calhoun (1988) asks, 
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“will we repeat the same militaristic metaphors of conquest and mastery in describing 
conflicts between compassion and duty which have dominated?” (695). Surely, there is 
gender in this battle metaphor, this connotation of war. Frank (1991) does his best to 
resist, asserting that, “we can’t fight cancer or tumors...illness is not a fight against an 
other” (89). The man who participated in this project as patient 7 also resists it, saying 
that he’s “not a fighter. I’ve never been in a fight in my life, I’m not a fighting-type 
person.” Does that doom him to death? Here, medicine’s hierarchical and gendered 
structure is evident. There is gender too in the “moral theories and arguments [that] are 
conceived of as weapons... winning might take precedence over truth” (Warren 1989, 83-
84). 
 
Practical Applications of Patient Listening  
 If the results of my project give pause to busy physicians for even a moment, and 
if it is able to give voice to marginalized patients, to bring attention to a single moment in 
the medical encounter that is significant, and to allow the words and experiences of these 
patients to be expressed in a creative way that calls attention to their authentic (though 
non-medical) experiences, then it is worthwhile to the greater challenge of progress in 
bioethics. Herwaldt (2008) encourages laypeople and healthcare workers alike to read the 
results of her project for their own “edification and enjoyment” and to also “savor the 
language and the vivid descriptions, to respond both viscerally and rationally to the 
stories and the emotions, and to reflect on how they as practitioners can improve their 
relationships with patients” (9). If patients are exposed to the results, she likewise hopes 
that the work will encourage them to “identify which elements of their own stories are 
essential to their treatment and will at the same time challenge them to seek clinicians 
who listen attentively” (11). 
 It would be unrealistic and even somewhat silly to advocate that all, most, or even 
some physicians actually use this method and apply it to their own patients; to advocate 
that social workers or nurses do it would just be to perpetuate gendered stereotypes of 
who should be doing the caring. Instead, this project could: 
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• contribute to the literature: if students or physicians are able to take a few minutes 
to read the resulting poems, to themselves or out loud,  and to discuss them with 
others, then they might be able to see similar experiences in their own patients, 
and maybe slow down to listen more closely.  
• be presented during medical education or continuing medical education.   
• as Herwaldt suggests, be background material for students to read when learning 
how to do patient histories, and learning to listen closely, as they “show how just 
one sentence or one word can destroy even the possibility of a therapeutic 
relationship” (7). 
• or when students are learning about a specific disease, like cancer. 
• be presented in a group setting in order to trigger discussion about ethical issues 
or communication or compassion or empathy, or to practice communication or 
listening skills, as Herwaldt found that if she “listened carefully, and deeply, I 
could work more efficiently and effectively and also achieve greater satisfaction 
for both my patients and myself” (8). 
• expose others to the poems, which would be both promoting new ideas of truth in 
medicine and the feminist goal of eliminating oppression. 
• encourage trainees to consider their patients’ experience or even try to craft 
poems themselves. 
• Likewise, oncologists who enter into long-term relationships with patients with 
high stakes could try this method with the patient in order to foster a deeper 
relationship, more thorough communication, and a higher standard of care. 
 
  If a “narrator must keep a safe distance from the story but a lyric speaker must 
occupy the lyric moment as it’s happening,” then maybe, as lyric speakers, the narrators 
of these poems are able to get readers closer to the emotion and to the action, provoking a 
more powerful reaction (Manguso 2008, 166). Maybe poetic forms of narrative “commit 
the poet to neither closure nor openness but to some always-changing relation between 
the two” (Shapiro 1993, 41). These poetic narratives form a dialectic between opening 
and closure, and they are often in flux; they are circular, with words and themes 
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repeating. They resist ending or concluding. According to narrative ethics, ethical 
principles and theories are derived from stories, which then translate into lived 
experience in a circular way; poetry is likewise circular, often without a clear beginning 
or end. Narrative is essential for ethical medical practice: indeed, narrative is essential in 
revealing our own deepest values, some of which only emerge when viewed through a 
specific life story (Charon and Montello 2002). Morris (2001) writes that “narrative does 
not necessarily tell us who is right or wrong, it actively undermines the false confidence... 
that ethical dilemmas necessarily call or accommodate a singular right action” (64). 
Likewise, Sleigh (2006) finds that, instead of taking sides, poetry is simultaneously 
responsive to all sides at once. 
 Like Herwaldt, this experience and these “narratives taught me to welcome 
patients’ stories” (8). Coulehan (2006b) muses that sometimes it seems that poetry can 
break through an impenetrable barrier. Rather than solely in overarching theory, medical 
ethics exists in the details and contexts of the lives and experiences of patients. Ethical 
conclusions might change with more understanding of context. Frank (1995) references 
the “ethical ideal of existing for the other,” writing that “by telling stories, ethical choices 
are made” (52). My original contribution to the field of bioethics is embodied in a 
creative way of expressing patient experience. I amplified the voices of patients not 
previously heard in a unique way, validating their narrative ways of knowing as different 
but complementary to physician perspectives. These perspectives are also truth, though 
different from empirical truth, and they can be at least as valuable in the shared interest of 
healing. The patients who participated in my study are empowered beyond this 
validation—by giving them some control over their own narratives and experiences of 
illness, by giving them some choice over how to frame their own stories, and by trusting 
these stories as true and authentic, regardless of their verifiability. In my poems is 
evidence of how deeply embedded my subjects are in their social and familial networks, 
and how no medical choice is made in a vacuum. They are not fiercely independent and 
atomistic agents, particularly in illness, and to base their autonomy in such an 
understanding would be inaccurate. Their narratives provide evidence for a more robust, 
relational view of autonomy. My patient-subjects are oppressed by their status of not 
being trusted as truth-tellers in contrast with medical ways of knowing. They are 
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oppressed by illness. My project fulfills the feminist dictum of working to eliminate 
oppression, in whatever form in may be—just as there are different definitions of 
oppression, there are different definitions of autonomy and truth, and I have sought to 
illuminate them.  
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